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The United States is facing a nexus of deteriorating infrastructure, single-purpose 
infrastructure, and a changing climate.  As these forces collide and interact, infrastructure 
systems are pushed to the edge of their capacity and begin to collapse.  The Spencer Dam failure 
in March of 2019 is an example of what can happen when these competing forces go unchecked.  
The Spencer Dam was 40 years past its life expectancy, was designed for hydroelectricity, and 
collapsed in the midst of a nation-wide storm event that produced large amounts of rain and ice 
which flooded the river.   
Spencer Dam is not the only dam to fail in recent years and it will not be the last.  The 
United States infrastructure is in disarray and Spencer Dam presents a case study through which 
it is possible to identify several specific weakness afflicting the country’s dam infrastructure.  
There are over 90,000 dams in the United States and many of them have passed their predicted 
life expectancy of 50 years.  Repairs to this system will cost billions of dollars, but waiting for 
the dams to collapse and repairing the resulting damage will cost much more.   
This paper identifies defects in the United States’ dam infrastructure, how these defects 
play out as seen by examining Spencer Dam, and what these defects mean for the future of the 





CHAPTER 1.    INTRODUCTION TO POLICY PAPER  
In March 2019, the Spencer Dam in Nebraska failed.  The specific conditions that led to 
this dam failure are unique, but the underlying vulnerabilities afflict countless dams across the 
United States.  No dam is completely protected from failure and the dam in Spencer, Nebraska 
illustrates what happens on a small scale when dam failures occur (Federal Emergency 
Management Agency (FEMA), 2012A).  There are two primary questions this report aims to 
answer.  First, how did planning and policy decisions about Spencer Dam lead to the dam’s 
collapse?  On a larger scale, to what extent are these decisions and resulting deficiencies seen 
throughout the United States’ dam infrastructure?  Second, how do planning and policy need to 
change in order to overcome the current issues?  What could have prevented - or at least 
mitigated - Spencer Dam’s collapse?  What needs to be done to reduce future dam failures 
throughout the country?  
These questions desperately need to be answered as 15,500 of the 90,000 dams included 
in the United States’ National Inventory of Dams (NID) (Association of State Dam Safety 
Officials (ASDSO), n.d. A), are deemed to be of high-hazard concern to their surroundings 
(American Society of Civil Engineers (ASCE), n.d.).  With over 17% of all dams in the United 
States considered highly dangerous – a number that climbs every year for reasons that will be 
explored more fully later on – immediate attention is required to combat and shore up these 
vulnerabilities.  Unlike many other natural hazards, local communities cannot build up 
experiential knowledge with dams.  Dam failures usually only occur once as dams are either not 
rebuilt, or built to higher standards, thus preventing a repeat of the disaster.  It is thus crucial for 
communities to learn from dam failure events elsewhere in order to increase their readiness and 




in the vicinity of at least one dam,” albeit likely unknowingly (FEMA, 2013D).  For now, it will 
be sufficient to allocate rising dam hazard risks to three main factors: age, purpose, and 
dangerous development.   
Dams constructed throughout the 20th century were built to last around half a century.  The 
average age of dams in the United States has now reached 56 years.  Averages can be 
misleading, with outliers pulling the average either up or down.  It is thus helpful to look at the 
distribution of dam ages.  This form of analysis shows that 7 out of 10 dams will have reached 
their half-century mark by the year 2025 (ASCE, n.d.).  The map below examines the percentage 
of dams in each stage that will be 50 years or older by 2020.  Adding to this, dams are built for 
many different reasons and thus according to different standards and construction requirements 
(Associated Press, 2019).  Regardless of their initial or intended purposes, many dams are now 
playing a part in flood control, regardless of how well-suited they are to that role.  Their de facto 
role in the United States’ flood control infrastructure is due to the fact that dams can gather and 
hold water, preventing the water adding to potential flood conditions downstream (United States 
Society on Dams (USSD), n.d.).  However, while dams can initially catch water in reservoirs, 
they can be overwhelmed by the amount or quick onset of rain, especially if the dams and their 
reservoirs were not built with the role of flood catchment in mind. These two stressors, aging 
structures and changing roles, increase the likelihood of dam failure, while construction 
downstream of dams has increased the costs that will occur should a dam fail (Lane, 2006).   
This paper begins with an overview of infrastructure in the United States, the role of the 
federal government in dams and water policy, and the changes in the planning and policy 
approaches to dams over the years.  Having set the stage, the paper moves onto an analysis of 




the damage inflicted by the dam’s collapse.  This account of events is followed by an 
examination of the four stages of emergency management as it applies to this case study: the 
mitigation of hazards or dam preparedness pre-event, the immediate response, and the long-term 
recovery efforts.  Often, reduction and readiness occur simultaneously while response and 
recovery tend to overlap.  Once Spencer Dam has been sufficiently covered, the identified 
problems will be examined in the context of dam infrastructure across the country to determine if 
these vulnerabilities are specific to Spencer Dam alone, or if they are systemic.  As will be seen, 
Spencer Dam is an apt case study to draw general conclusions from when studying the nation’s 
dam infrastructure.  Spencer Dam did not fail from any unique weakness but rather was affected 
by a myriad of issues that chipped away its protective qualities unnoticed and these issues are 
common throughout the country.  This paper contains a literature review, case study overview, 
systemic dam infrastructure analysis, a brief section on potential policy solutions, and concludes 





CHAPTER 2.    LITERATURE REVIEW 
Infrastructure Preconceptions 
Infrastructure within the United States is defined by contradictory worldviews, at once 
necessary but dismissed.  Infrastructure can be defined as “a subset of public works, comprising 
the permanent physical installations and facilities supporting socioeconomic activities in a 
community, region, or nation,” (Kaufman & Snape, 1997).  Another common definition refers to 
infrastructure as “the ‘backbone’ of the economy, connecting people and business to jobs, goods, 
services, information, and customers (both) in and outside of the U.S.,” (Committee for 
Economic Development of the Conference Board, n.d.).  Amenities such as electricity and water 
as well as services such as transportation systems and emergency services are all considered 
critical infrastructure networks.  Despite having a general conception of what makes up 
infrastructure, the exact boundaries of different infrastructure networks are often indistinct.  How 
large or important does something need to be to be included in the inventory of national 
infrastructure?  Are trails or dirt roads considered part of the larger transportation network?  
Should small locks and dams used only for water control of a particular field be part of the 
National Dam Inventory?  If not, what are they?  Every list has its own cutoffs, its own standards 
of criticality or importance required for inclusion and it is important to be aware of what is 
included or overlooked (Edwards et al., 2009).   
One of the reasons it is important to consider critically the question of what infrastructure 
means and encompasses is because infrastructure in general is too often dismissed.  Over the last 
two centuries, there has been an inflow of people into urban settings.  Large cities struggled to 
build adequate infrastructure to keep up with their growing populaces and the result is that today 




hidden or unnoticed (Kaufman, 2006).  The most common explanation for individual 
indifference and ignorance towards these complex systems providing residents with daily 
services is that their presence by this point is simply taken for granted (Graham, 2012).  It is 
expected that cities in the United States will handle the distribution of water and energy, the 
maintenance of transport and communication systems, the removal of waste, and the 
encouragement of businesses.  These infrastructure systems are so ingrained with our definition 
of ‘city’ and ‘modern urban life’ that they are rarely considered separately (Graham & Thrift, 
2007).  A common argument is that infrastructure has been made invisible, hidden away, and is 
thus out of sight, out of mind.  But there are other ways to render something ‘invisible.’  As 
Kaufman and Snape argue, “public indifference is bred by familiarity,” (Kaufman & Snape, 
1997).  In short, invisibility is not invisible strictly referring to whether something is  hidden 
away, but rather that its mundanity has fostered public indifference or boredom which has 
created the impression of invisibility based on lack of active contemplation (Ugarte, 2017).  
Thus, despite “its centrality in maintaining and enhancing the quality of the natural and urban 
environment” (Kaufman & Snape, 1997),  infrastructure is rarely discussed or contemplated, 
resulting in negligible policy debate.   
This normalized support system is not necessarily negative.  It is indicative of a high 
living standard if such services are expected.  Infrastructure is also often designed to be 
overlooked, to be in the background.  As designer Bruce Mau argues, “The secret ambition of 
design is to become invisible, to be taken up into a culture, absorbed into the background,” 
(Graham, 2012).  He argues that “the highest order of success in design is to achieve ubiquity, to 
become banal,” (Graham, 2012).  This argument has also been taken up by anthropologists 




disappear almost by definition.  The easier they are to use the harder they are to see.  As well, 
most of the time, the bigger they are, the harder they are to see” (Bowker & Leigh-Star, 2000).  
In other words, if one wants to see infrastructure, it must first cease being usable.   
Public debate around infrastructure arises after a malfunction when the services provided 
by it is no longer guaranteed (Little, 2002).  Public, and thus political, concerns center around 
returning the infrastructure to working condition as soon as possible.  As Felbinger wryly put it, 
“public works do not become issues until they do not work,” (Kaufman & Snape, 1997).  As 
most of the infrastructure we use has been around for decades, it is hard to fully conceptualize 
how much people rely on these networks.  The breakdown of infrastructure is helpful to 
determine how ‘critical’ critical infrastructure actually is.  Breakdown also helps illustrate the 
complexity of the systems people rely on.  What are the base components of an infrastructure 
network?  How are different networks interconnected?  Disruptions to infrastructure provide 
opportunities for critical policy and planning analysis.  What went wrong?  What needs to 
change to reduce the chance of this happening again? 
Unfortunately, the general indifference to infrastructure, broken occasionally by short 
term demands, has resulted in little public debate and the outcome of any debate being of little 
political concern.  The presumption that infrastructure will continue working is supplemented by 
cognitive barriers that also reduce the likelihood of intense public scrutiny and debate (Kaufman 
& Snape, 1997).  These include the normal challenges accompanied by long term planning and 
the basic scientific – often engineering-based – knowledge required for infrastructure 
maintenance activities.  There are numerous studies illustrating that people often choose short-
term gains over long-term benefits.  There is also a rising mistrust in, and disinterest of, scientific 




infrastructure systems dissuades the public from becoming more involved.  The projects that do 
get attention tend to be short and involve relatively easy fixes.  Complex infrastructure – such as 
replacing water pipes, building railroads – are sometimes expanded upon but rarely replaced or 
revamped (Deloitte Insights, 2016).   
Long term planning of public services falls to elected officials in all levels of planning.  
Unfortunately, long-term planning is unlikely to help individuals secure re-election and thus 
these issues are often pushed to the side (Kaufman & Snape, 1997).  The lack of public interest 
in the mechanics behind maintaining and restoring critical infrastructure systems has also 
allowed those in charge of infrastructure networks to remain faceless and unaccountable for the 
actions they choose, or choose not, to take (Ugarte, 2017).     
Infrastructure underpins economic activity and “transforms natural, social, and urban 
life,” (Graham, 2012).  There is increasing frustration in the United States with the current state 
of aging infrastructure systems but this frustration has yet to produce meaningful political 
changes.  
Public vs. Private Ownership 
Unlike other types of infrastructure within the United States, dams are primarily privately 
owned rather than public entities managed by the government (Kriley, 2019).  Around 65% of 
dams belong to private owners, 20% are controlled by local governments, 7% controlled by state 
governments, and 8% by the federal government, as seen in Figure 1 (ASDSO, n.d. C).   This 
unique distribution of dam ownership leads to numerous problems that are not present in solely 








The first problem is that of regulation.  Dams can be highly dangerous if not properly 
maintained and can affect wide swaths of land.  However, dam owners are the ones responsible 
for inspections, maintenance, and general upkeep (White, 2019).  Government agencies and 
groups do exist to help private dam owners manage their dams, but ultimately the dam owners 
are responsible for initiating the process.   
The second problem is that since maintenance and improvements are the responsibility of 
the owner, the owner must foot the bill (ASDSO, n.d. C).  Maintenance and dam rehabilitation 
projects can be inordinately expensive, beyond the means of many people, resulting in dam 
maintenance often being overlooked (Bass, 2003).  The dearth of sufficient funds to help owners 
complete regular maintenance increases the risk of dam failure and often results in a problem 
becoming more expensive to fix over time.  
Federal regulations apply to federally owned dams and are expressed through the specific 
department the dam falls under.  For example, a dam under the Army Corps of Engineers gets its 




rules from the military whereas one owned by the Department of Agriculture would look to the 
agriculture department for guidance.  Private ownership largely moves dams outside of the 
sphere of federal regulation.  States are far more exacting with the standards they desire dams to 
meet, although the stringency of these standards vary greatly between states.  But there is only so 
much regulatory pressure a state government can apply to privately owned dams.  Private dams 
have regulations issued by states which they are supposed to meet but lack of knowledge, lack of 
funding, and lack of oversight can reduce the ability of dams to meet state regulations.  Should a 
dam fail, the owner can be held liable for the failure, but again to what extent they are held 
accountable and in which circumstances varies greatly between states such that no conclusive 
statement can be made in regards private liability for dam failure to the country as a whole.  The 
general rule of thumb is that owners are “required to use ‘reasonable care’ in the operation and 
maintenance of a dam and reservoir” and successfully pleading their case in court can absolve 
owners of accountability in the event that their dam fails (ASDSO, n.d. C).   
Federal & State Involvement 
Federal involvement in dam management across the United States is disjointed and 
composed of a dozen different organizations.  The Army Corps of Engineers is one of the older 
participants in dam creation and management of dams in the United States but it is joined by the 
Department of Agriculture, Department of Defense, Department of Energy, Department of the 
Interior, the Department of Labor and State, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, etc 
(ASDSO, n.d. A).  With each agency applying their own priorities and standards, who supervises 
dams at the federal level is not a clear cut matter.  The Federal Emergency Management Agency 
(FEMA) helps coordinate these separate organizations and administers the National Dam Safety 




implements, and evaluates disaster management and reduction at key dams as well as overseeing 
financial grants and research. 
While the federal government through FEMA encourages a minimum standard of dam 
safety that varies on a state-by-state basis, federal government involvement with dams is limited.  
States are the main legislative body dictating rules, standards, and regulations with local 
governments stepping up to help plan around individual dams (Bass, 2003).   
In Nebraska, the state’s interest in dams manifests in several key activities.  New dam 
creation and significant changes to existing dams require state approval.  The state maintains an 
active inventory of dams in Nebraska organizes periodic inspections of all dams listed in the 
inventory.  Beyond ensuring standards for the physical dam, the state also offers training to dam 
operators and owners and can help create emergency action plans and preparations (Nebraska 
Department of Natural Resources (NDNR), n.d.). 
Dam Upkeep and Inspection Process 
Regular inspection has been determined to be necessary to ensure the safe operation and 
maintenance of dams (ASDSO, n.d. C).  Of the 90,000 dams within the United States, state 
governments have been charged with the task of inspecting 70% of these dams at regular 
intervals (ASDSO, n.d. A).  Unfortunately, inspection is only useful if maintenance 
recommendations are actually undertaken but high costs often prevent owners from fulfilling all 
the necessary dam improvements.  Because dams have wide reaching effects if they should fail, 
after failures the state often takes dam owners to court to examine whether the dam owner was 
negligent in mitigating dam risks or if they kept up with inspections and regular maintenance 
(ASDSO, n.d. B).  It has been estimated that dam improvements in the United States, excluding 
those dams owned by the federal government, now exceed $70 billion in expected maintenance 




2019).  At some point, the expense becomes large enough that problems identified through 
inspection are left unaddressed.  Congress provides little help in covering these costs (Bliss, 
2017).  Multiple breakdowns and bottlenecks occur annually and are likely to increase in number 
over time as more dams fall into disrepair.  The disruption of transport of goods along with costs 
from potential disasters due to dam failure “cost the United States economy millions annually,” 
(Bliss, 2017).  
How Has Understanding of Dams Changed Over Time? 
Government 
Many conditions came together to act as an impetus for the United States’ era of dam 
building in the first half of the 20th century.  To begin with, the southern plain region of the 
United States was ravaged first by the dust bowl and then by severe floods throughout the 1930s 
and 1940s (Kelley, 2019).  Something needed to change: the landscape needed to be manipulated 
and rearranged to mediate both the lack of water and the overabundance of it.  Dams had been 
built prior to this era, primarily by the Army Corps of Engineers in their efforts to control the 
Mississippi and other eastern river networks (Arnold, 1989).  But the economic advantage and 
population increase following World War II meant that the United States’ government found 
itself with an abundance of resources they could and did invest in infrastructure improvements 
across the country (FEMA, 2012B).   
However, with the increase in dams, there was also an increase in dam failures.  While 
increased understanding in engineering and environmental studies has decreased the total 
number of dam failures over time, many dams currently in existence are not built to modern 
standards.  With increased dam failures, the government realized that some regulation and 
oversight would be necessary to ensure the safety of people living downstream of dams 




the 1920s,” (ASDSO, n.d. A).  In 2020, every state except Alabama has a dam safety program 
that they developed to hold their local dams accountable and increase resident safety (ASDSO, 
n.d. A).  
While there has been significant improvement in the last century, most of the changes in 
dam safety regulations have occurred in the last 50 years.  The 1970s were marked by “a string 
of significant dam failures,” (ASDSO, n.d. A).  In 1971, the Lower Van Norman Dam in 
California failed (FEMA, 2013C).  This, along with a the failure of the Baldwin Hills Dam in 
California a few years earlier, helped popularize dam breach inundation mapping (FEMA, 
2013C).  In 1972, congress enacted the National Dam Inspection Act which “authorized the 
Secretary of the Army to inspect non-federal dams” of a certain hazard risk level, an important 
step to take considering most dams within the United States are non-federal (FEMA, 2013C) 
(FEMA, 2016B).  The Secretary of the Army issued an order for an updated National Inventory 
of Dams and helped organize the inspections of high-hazard dams across the country (Cornell 
Law School, n.d.).  1977 saw a presidential memorandum directing the numerous and varied 
agencies involved with dam oversight to review and update their safety programs (FEMA, 
2013C).  The Reclamation Safety of Dams Act of 1978 increased the federal government’s 
oversight and maintenance abilities of their own dams (FEMA, 2013C).  In the same year, a dam 
break in West Virginia inspired Kai Erikson to write Everything in Its Path, one of the 
foundational books regarding dam failures but that also explored the aftermath of disasters in 
general (Erikson, 1978).  The 1970s concluded with FEMA adopting the Federal Guidelines for 
Dam Safety (FEMA, 2016B).   
The National Dam Safety Program was created in 1996 (FEMA, 2013C).  This program 




an organized disaster response (FEMA, 2016B).  Through the various efforts of the latter half of 
the 20th century, the United States has managed to reduce the number of fatalities that occur 
when a dam fails but there is still room for improvement and the reduction of economic costs 
inflicted by these disasters.   
Environment and Climate Concerns 
Infrastructure and climatic concerns are often treated as competing points of importance 
(Cassidy & DeGood, 2019).  Infrastructure is deeply linked with the economy and in a culture 
where economic growth and success are promoted as a necessity, infrastructure benefits from 
this association (Cassidy & DeGood, 2019).  Until recently the environment and, even more 
recently, climatic concerns and planning were seen as bonuses; that is to say, something that’s 
nice to have but not essential (Cassidy & DeGood, 2019).  Changing attitudes towards the 
natural world have increased attention paid to the environment.  As the importance of the 
environment has been reassessed, its connection with infrastructure has become apparent.  
Infrastructure may improve economic growth, but it is also often at fault, directly or indirectly, 
for greenhouse gas emissions (Cassidy & DeGood, 2019).  For example, a good road network 
facilitates if not encourages a large amount of greenhouse gas emissions from personal 
automobiles that consolidated public transportation systems would not.  
In regards to dams, environmental consequences are complex.  Richard White in his 1995 
book, The Organic Machine, examines how dams and other activities on the Columbia River 
have severely altered the river’s ecosystem, including the complex relationship of native salmon 
in the river and for the surrounding populace (White, 1996).  The popularization of the impacts 
of dams on local fish populations and the resulting efforts of people to save these populations 
have led to dam removal along the northwest coast of the United States (Gan, 2020).  In 




extinction throughout the river ecosystem (Hossain et al., 2012).  In addition to changes in the 
ecological life of dammed rivers, studies indicate that the presence of dams spurs a change in 
local human activity (Hossain et al., 2012).  Dams have been found to encourage different land-
use decisions, increasing irrigation of fields, urbanization, deforestation, and afforestation or 
commercial tree farms (Hossain et al., 2012).  While the climatic impacts of dams themselves, 
excluding all other changes that occur in nearby land use or local human populations, has been 
understudied, there is evidence of localized feedback systems along dams (Hossain et al., 2012).  
The observed changes indicated that dams affect temperature and precipitation along the affected 
river.    
There is an increased understanding that dams have effects on local ecosystems and this 
should be taken into account when making decisions regarding dams (Gan, 2020).  Most dams in 
the United States built in earlier years did not include the environment in their cost analysis and 
the impacts of this are still affecting the United States. 
The Twenty-First Century 
The era of dam building in the United States has come to an end.  This is not limited to 
the “big dams” from the first few decades of the 1900s but encompasses the country’s opinion on 
dams of all sizes.  This sentiment is captured in Hossain’s and colleagues’ statement: “In the 
United States, statistics suggest that building dams is outdated and considered a twentieth-
century construct by the civil engineering profession,” (Hossain et al., 2012).   
This sentiment is echoed throughout the government.  The head of the United States 
Bureau of Reclamation, one of the departments in charge of dams in the United States, stated at 
an international conference in 1994 that “the dam building era in the United States is over” and 
that “the United States would be finding alternative ways to solve its water problems,” (Gan, 




and the expected benefits did not appear upon completion, leaving the builders with large deficits 
(Gan, 2020).   
The Problem of Our Time: Climate Change 
The effects of climate change must be considered in every project, plan, and policy the 
world moves forward.  The impact of climate change is particularly relevant when discussing 
dams and dam failures.  Because climate change is inextricably tied with water, both droughts 
and inundation are expected in parts of the United States.   
Figure 2 shows the changes in rainfall across the United States between 1901-2015.  This 
data, colored by the National 
Oceanic and Atmospheric 
Administration, shows trends of 
increasing rainfall in the Midwest 
and Northeast with decreasing 
rainfall in the Southwest.  Dams 
can help control and collect water 
for drought-stricken areas, but it is 
inundation that overwhelms dams 
and increases the risk of dam 
failures (Leslie, 2019).  Threats to 
dams are more likely in places 
where the increase of rain occurs 
in a few extreme weather events rather than spread more evenly throughout the year.  
Additionally, when extreme weather events affect large portions of the country, cities and states 




downriver will be flooded. For example, increased rainfall in the Dakotas, Minnesota, and Iowa, 
increases the chance of flooding in Missouri.   
Risk assessment looks to the past to determine what type of hazards have affected a 
region and are likely to occur again.  Risk assessment is a critical component of building design 
and policy formation. However the risk assessments of the past no longer work in times of 
largescale change.  How, then, should planners and builder prepare for the future?  What 
information should be drawn upon when conducting risk analysis for a region?  Climate change 
is a concept that scientists are still studying but general trends, such as changes in rainfall, have 
been uncovered and can be taken into account when planning for the future.  However there is 
now a greater uncertainty that accompanies all plans for the future, thus a greater potential for 
future disasters that planers and builders must face when helping physically create the future.   
Cost Analysis of Dams  
Benefits: Why Were Dams Built in the First Place? 
Dams can serve numerous purposes and often serve multiple purposes at once.  Perhaps 
somewhat surprisingly, over 40% of the dams listed in the National Inventory of Dams (NID) 
were built for recreational purposes (Lane, 2006).  Just examining those dams maintained by the 
Army Corps of Engineers, it is estimated that 10% of the United States’ population visits at least 
one dam or connected reservoir every year (ASDSO, n.d. A).   
Historically, another important role dams were built to fulfill was the creation of a 
guaranteed water source (Hossain et al., 2012).  Water can then either be earmarked for 
municipal, agriculture, or industrial needs.  Of the water used in farming across the country, 10% 
comes from dams (ASDSO, n.d. A).  Dams can also be used to generate hydropower.  The 
United States is the second-largest producer of hydroelectricity in the world, Canada being the 




Dams are often associated with flood control and “18% of dams in the national inventory 
serve as flood control,” (ASCE, n.d.).  By reducing flooding, dams can also help reduce erosion. 
Lastly, dams are crucial to the United States’ economy as they maintain inland water routes for 
commerce.  It is estimated that tens of billions of dollars’ worth of commodities traverse the 
United States’ rivers each year (Bliss, 2017).    
Costs: When Dams Fail in the United States 
Regardless of the numerous benefits dams provide, there is constant risk surrounding 
dams.  As Lane stated in a Congressional Research Service Paper, “(dam) risk stems from two 
sources: the likelihood of a dam failure and the damage it would cause,” (Lane, 2006).  Dam 
failures and the resulting floods are more like floods that accompany tsunamis rather than typical 
river or coastal floods.  This is due to the fact that “when dams fail, they don’t fail with 
warning,” (Associated Press, 2019).  The damage resulting from dam failures is wide-ranging, 
often inflicts death or injury, damages physical structures and farms, and results in a loss of key 
infrastructure services, large amounts of debris, and road closures (FEMA, 2012A).   Such 
impacts have been displayed and documented in the hundreds of dam failures the United States 
has experienced (FEMA, 2012A). 
Costs can be divided into human, economic, and environmental categories, although the 
boundaries between these are fluid rather than rigid.  Humans can experience injuries or death.  
Sudden dam failures can inflict long-lasting trauma on a population.  It is also not uncommon for 
dam failures to “cause significant and long-term social effects, resulting in changes to the quality 
of life in the affected communities,” (FEMA, 2012A)(Erikson, 1976).  Economic impacts can be 
either direct or indirect (FEMA, 2012A).  Direct impacts occur in the immediate aftermath of the 
failure while indirect consequences become apparent in the months and years following the 




insurance required for those living in the inundation zone (FEMA, 2013D).  Purchasing extra 
insurance is encouraged by the government but many do not realize they live in a dam inundation 
zone or they underestimate the risk a dam presents.  Environmentally, the release of large 
amounts of water in a short period of time scours downstream environments, often contaminates 
the water, and heavily impacts downstream ecosystems – be they crops and livestock or forests.   
There are however costs beyond that of potential dam failure.  There is constant tension 
within the United States over possible unequal benefits delivered by dams.  There is a political 
aspect regarding where dams are built and why, where water is redirected and prioritized, as well 
as when and why controlled releases of water occur (Congressional Record, 1994).  With 
numerous demands for water from different sectors in the United States, contention over the 
management of water via dams is likely to be present as long as dams exist.   
There are also environmental consequences of dams while they stand as well as when 
they fail.  As more research is undertaken, it is becoming apparent that dams create secondary 
impacts that were not expected or planned for.  The disruption on local ecosystems is 
increasingly well documented and is now consistently part of the conversation regarding dams 





CHAPTER 3.    SPENCER DAM: A HISTORY 
Lifespan 
When attempting to understand what happened to the Spencer Dam on the Niobrara 
River in Nebraska, it is important to begin with a discussion of design.  Figure 3 shows the 
location of Spencer Dam in relation to the rest of the state of Nebraska.  Spencer Dam was 
designed as a hydroelectric dam (ASDSO, 2020).  It was not designed to play an active part in 
flood control in the region but nonetheless that is a role it assumed.  The dam continued being 
able to produce hydroelectricity as needed until its demise in a flood event in 2019.   
 
The dam was a 3,700-foot dam of earthen construction with a 400-foot gated spillway 
and powerhouse section, and a 3,300-foot earthen dam embankment (Hammel, 2019C).  The 
reservoir the dam created was estimated to hold up to 16,500 acre-feet (Yoders, 2019). The other 




important element of the dam’s design was that when it was built in the 1920s, it had a predicted 
lifespan of 50 to 60 years.  The Spencer Dam was 92 years old when it failed, and had thus long 
since surpassed its original predicted age of retirement.  Not only was the dam long past its age 
of best use, so to speak, but the water levels a century ago were considerably below what the 
dam has had to deal with in recent years (Pollock, 2019).   
Due to its creation almost a century ago, the Spencer Dam, whilst capable of generating 
electricity, pre-dated the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) and thus was not 
under FERC control (ASDSO, 2020).  Instead, the dam was owned and regulated by the state, 
with the Nebraska Public Power District (NPPD) having bought the structure in the 1970s 
(ASDSO, 2020).   
Risk Classification 
Across the United States, dams are classified based on their hazard potential.  Hazard 
potential correlates to the predicted consequences should the dam fail.  Dam failures can result in 
many types of damage and loss, but risk classification or hazard potential focuses on the possible 
loss of human life (FEMA, 2015).  High-risk classification thus indicates that should a dam fail, 
it is probable that at least one person will die.  FEMA’s classification of hazard potential can be 
seen in Table 1.  In most places of the United States, dams are inspected regularly and one of the 
inspection outcomes is the reclassification of risk based on current hazard potential.  The 
National Dam Safety Program’s purpose statement indicates the paramountcy of human life 




followed by property or economic damage; “(purpose is) to reduce the risks to life and property 
from dam failure in the United States through the establishment and maintenance of an effective 
national dam safety program to bring together the expertise and resources of the federal and non-
federal communities in achieving national dam safety hazard reduction,” (FEMA, 2016B). 
The most recent inspection of Spencer Dam occurred in 2018, a year before the dam’s 
failure.  At the time, the dam was earmarked as possessing significant risk towards the homes 
and their inhabitants located downriver (Hammel, 2019A).   
Dam Condition 
Whilst risk classification centers on what should happen if a dam were to fail, it has 
nothing to do with the physical conditions of the dam or if the dam is likely to fail in the first 
place.  The classification of dam condition is not exact, with more variance between states and 
individual inspectors than that experienced in risk classification (Associated Press, 2019).   
In the 2018 inspection, Spencer Dam was determined to be in “fair condition.”  Breaking 
this classification down, Spencer Dam was considered well maintained, with “acceptable 
performance expected under most conditions,” (Associated Press, 2019).  With the aid of 
hindsight, the warning that “deficiencies exist which could lead to dam failure during rare, 
extreme storm events,” is particularly ominous (Hammel, 2019A).  Nonetheless, as the 
Associated Press at the New York Post points out, until the Spencer Dam failed, it was 
“indistinguishable from thousands of dams across the United States,” (Associated Press, 2019).  
While the first statement is worrisome in regards to Spencer Dam, this latter statement is 
worrisome in regards to the entire dam infrastructure network across the United States.  
Natural Environment, Built Environment, & Past Failures 
Prior to the dam being built, the Niobrara River was surrounded by floodplains.  After 




into farmland (Pollock, 2019).  Thus human habitation moved closer to the newly contained river 
as the farms transformed the landscape.  With humans living closer to the river, engineers were 
forced to increase the protections around the river as any flood became more likely to affect 
humans (Pollock, 2019).   
The landscape immediately upriver of the Spencer Dam increased the likelihood of 
incidents occurring at the dam.  The Niobrara River has easily eroded sand beds which have 
created a braided morphology within the riverbed, resulting in multiple shallow streams of water 
with high surface area to volume ratio (ASDSO, 2020).  This becomes problematic when paired 
with Nebraska’s rapidly changing weather patterns and cold winters which result in ice 
formation.  Due to the increased surface level of the water, the amount of ice that can form on 
the river in the right conditions is considerable.  Upriver there are also a series of bridges that 
confine the river to a specific width, often causing the ice to get stuck, condense into a more 
streamlined form, and eventually gather enough pressure to push past the bridges (ASDSO, 
2020).  
While the event that occurred in the spring of 2019 resulted in the total destruction of the 
Spencer Dam, it is not the first time the dam experienced trouble.  The dam was breached, 
although to a lesser, actually fixable extent, in 1935 due to ice flows (Miles, 2019).  This incident 
left the dam inoperable until repairs were made in the 1940s.  The dam was also overtopped in 
1960.  While water overran the dam, ice slammed into it, creating a puncture wound that had to 
be repaired after the incident.  The dam was banged up a bit more in 1966 during another ice 
event although the dam this time was not completely disabled.  The events that were witnessed in 
the 1966 incident are presumed to be identical to what occurred in 2019, the difference being that 




dam was less likely to be overtopped (ASDSO, 2020).  The operator on duty in 1966 described 
the event as “a wall of water and ice entering the reservoir,” (ASDSO, 2020).  The high water 
mark inside the dam control room and eyewitness accounts downstream verify that a large, 
powerful wave struck the dam and surrounding region.  
Question of Ownership 
Complicating the Spencer Dam failure is the fact that the dam was in the process of 
changing owners when it collapsed.  The NPPD had sold the structure and water rights to a 
“coalition of natural resources districts in the area for $9 million,” (Hammel, 2019C).  This sale 
was the end result of a Nebraska Supreme Court decision (Hendee, 2019).  The state of Nebraska 
experienced a drought in 2009.  The NPPD requested its allotment of water from the state, 
resulting in the state turning off farming irrigation pumps due to the shortage of water.  The 
resulting series of court cases stretched over 7 years.  Natural resource districts in the 
surrounding areas ended up banding together and forming the Niobrara River Basin Alliance.  
The result of the court cases was the valuation that the “water rights and electricity generated by 
the dam was worth around $12 million” of which the NPPD would receive $9 million in 
exchange for giving up their control of the dam and the water rights that went with it (Hendee, 
2019).   
With the dam gone and the transfer incomplete, the NPPD is left in charge of a now-
defunct dam and its associated water rights.  Should the dam be replaced, the NPPD would have 
to foot the bill and the damage is so extensive that builders would have to start from scratch.  
Rebuilding is an unlikely outcome as the NPPD was in the process of getting rid of the dam and 




CHAPTER 4.    SPENCER DAM: HOW IT FAILED 
Incident Report 
In March 2019, a bomb cyclone was predicted to hit Nebraska and the rest of the 
Midwest.  The forecast warned of anticipated rainfall of 2-3 inches delivered in mere hours 
(Genoways, 2019).  The investigation of the dam failure initiated after the event says that 
nothing could have been done to keep the dam standing (ASDSO, 2020).  The water and ice 
simply overwhelmed Spencer Dam’s capabilities.   
Facing high waters and ice chunks the size of cars, the 92-year-old dam was in trouble 
(Belsie, 2019).  The two operators working at Spencer Dam the night of March 13th were 
besieged with wind, freezing rain, snow, and rapidly changing conditions during the dark, early 
hours of the morning (ASDSO, 2020).  Attempting to control the increasingly dangerous 
conditions, the operators opted for a controlled release of water from the dam to relieve the 
building pressure.  Unfortunately, one of the gates had frozen shut, leading to the operators 
abandoning the structure (Belsie, 2019).   
Despite the problems faced at the gateway and the eventual failure that occurred there, 
the main breach actually “occurred towards the south end of the earthen dam embankment,” 
(Yoders, 2019).  By the time the sun had risen the entire riverbed of the Niobrara River had 
shifted to run through this new opening.  With the dam failure came a rush of water and large 
chunks of ice that battered nearby buildings and fields.  The ice chucks, a common characteristic 
on the Niobrara, were 1-2 feet thick and reached pickup-truck weights.  In the moments after the 
break the water gauge, which had rested around a height of 5-6 feet, soared to the maximum 
height of 17.5 feet (Salter, 2000).  In terms of water flow measured in cubic feet per second, the 




normal circumstances, the average flow is 1,500 cubic feet per second or 27 times smaller than 
the peak flow following the collapse.   
Following the collapse, NPPD officials argued that the dam was not at fault.  Rather, it 
was a victim of the “unprecedented combination of high (water) flows from the Niobrara River 
mixed with massive chunks of ice,” (Hammel, 2019C).  Indeed, in the immediate aftermath there 
was discussion across news sources that this dam failure due in large part to battering-ram-
shaped-ice chunks might indeed be the first of its kind in the United States.  However, the 
Spencer Dam failure in 2019 was not the first of its kind.  There have been other ice-impacted 
dams prior to last year, in fact, there had even been previous ice-impacted occurrences in 
Spencer Dam’s own history.  Ice was at fault for the 1935 breach as well as the 1960 overtopping 
(Miles, 2019).  Despite not being “unprecedented,” the Spencer Dam 2019 collapse has 
underlined the need for more research on the risks associated with the combination of snow, ice, 
and rain (White, 2019).   
Event In Context 
Handling an isolated incident is one thing, handling a rare extreme event that stretches 
across half the Midwest is exponentially more difficult.  States across the Upper Midwest, from 
Colorado through Minnesota, were hammered with a bomb cyclone that occurred in March of 
2019 (Erdman, 2020).  Figure 4 includes an image of the 2019 bomb cyclone from space, 
showing its wide ranging effects.  A bomb cyclone is generated by “the atmospheric expressway 
formed by the Plains in the transition from winter to spring (which) create(s) fast-moving 
weather systems,” (ASDSO, 2020).  One symptom of these cyclones is rapid and extreme 
fluctuations of temperature in the affected region.  In the spring of 2019, this led to the ground 
freezing while the atmosphere warmed sufficiently to produce large amounts of (rain rather than 




rivers and streams (Kelley, 2019).  The situation was not helped by the fact that the area received 
large amounts of rain the previous fall, which had left the ground saturated throughout the winter 
(Bloch, 2019). “It is difficult to know,” Emily Pollock wrote, “what the Army Corps of 
Engineers could have done differently.  A decades-old flood control system coupled with recent 
extreme weather meant that it was difficult for the agency to make any better choices,” (Pollock, 
2019).   
 
Across the Midwest, the storm killed four people and caused billions of dollars of 
damage (Pollock, 2019).  The National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) 
estimated that this bomb-cyclone was “one of the nation’s costliest inland flood events on 
record,” (Erdman, 2020).  In Nebraska alone 65 of the state’s 93 countries declared a state of 
emergency (Belsie, 2019).  The state’s governor referred to the March storm as “the most 
widespread destruction we have ever seen in our state’s history,” (Belsie, 2019).   
Damage 
Human Loss of Life 
Dam risk levels are classified based on the potential of human death associated with 
failure and thus damage assessment must first begin with this measure of hazard-turned-disaster.  




Kenneth Angel owned and occupied a house immediately downstream of the dam.  When 
officials decided to evacuate the dam, they stopped at his house and told him he had to leave 
immediately (ASDSO, 2020).  It is unclear, and likely will remain so, why Angel either did not 
or could not leave before he and his house were swept away.  Angel was the first person in the 
United States to die due to a dam since 2006 (Associated Press, 2019).   
Agriculture 
The flooding the bomb cyclone inflicted on Midwest states overlaps with the United 
States’ main agriculture hubs: Nebraska, South Dakota, Wisconsin, and Iowa.  Within these 
states, the bomb cyclone hit Nebraska the hardest with an early estimate of around $1 billion in 
agriculture loss (Bloch, 2019).  Nebraska is the second-largest cattle state with 6.4 million head 
of cattle along with other types of livestock also being raised.  Nebraska is also the third-largest 
corn producer in the country.  The livestock sector lost $500 million worth in damage, with the 
impacts to be felt for years.  The agricultural sectors within the state lost $400 million (Bloch, 
2019). 
This event is predicted to be the final straw for many local farmers (Bloch, 2019).  The 
country was already at a ten year high of the number of farmers filing for bankruptcy.  The trade 
wars with China, the reduction in federal government crop buying, disastrous weather and dam 
failures do not paint a pretty picture.  The Spencer Dam failure also occurred right before 
planting season which requires dry ground, or at least dryer ground, in order to be successful 
(Bloch, 2019).  Melissa Bell, a commercial agronomist for Mycogen Seeds, urged farmers to 
delay planting, and consequently have a shorter growing season rather than attempt to plant early 
and possibly having no growing season at all (Sents, 2019).   
Drowned land not only makes planting complicated but also “brings rot, mold, and other 




already started must be destroyed (Sents, 2019).  In the case of the Spencer Dam failure, the 
floodwater was likely polluted as the Nebraska Farmers Union determined that it took out gas 
stations, farm shops, and fuel barrels (Bloch, 2019). 
Once a dam fails, farmland is inundated and there is nothing farmers and planters can do 
but wait to begin the cleanup phase.  This is not the case with livestock.  It is possible to move 
livestock to safety, and that potential makes the losses more devastating as circumstances of dam 
collapse work against farmers (Genoways, 2019).  In the case of the Spencer Dam failure, it was 
in the midst of blizzard-like conditions, dangerous conditions developed rapidly, and it failed in 
the early hours of the morning when getting word to locals and getting just humans out of danger 
was difficult (Reiley, 2019). 
Most farms lost their calves (next year’s income) and their bulls (the animals with the 
highest genetic value), if not their entire herds (Reiley, 2019).  Nebraska is known for being 
relatively flat, with few high areas where herds could gather.  Those in pens were trapped.  Those 
not in pens were hit by a 
strong, fast-moving 
wave.  Figure 5 shows a 
lone cow walking 
through flooded fields in 
the aftermath of the bomb 
cyclone. Food stores 
were destroyed and the 
National Guard was 
required to step in and 





use helicopters to drop food near the livestock who survived the initial flood (Bloch, 2019).  For 
those who were able to access and move their herds, the state turned the fairgrounds in Lincoln 
to temporary shelters (Reiley, 2019).  Those animals who survived might be injured, 
traumatized, and unlikely to return to optimal productivity anytime soon (Reiley, 2019).   
While agriculture is often considered as its own infrastructure sector, it is also 
interconnected with and relies on other infrastructure systems.  Notably, functioning 
transportation systems are critical to functioning agriculture systems (Bloch, 2019).  In regards to 
crops, roads and railroads that are used to get produce to markets and supplies to farms were 
flooded or washed away.  In regards to livestock, many ranchers found themselves cut off, 
unable to reach their animals, unable to bring supplies to help them, and unable to move them to 
safer regions (Reiley, 2019).  Hence the reason that the National Guard resorted to helicopters to 
get food to animals.  Across the state, over 40 federal and state highways were closed not 
numerous county roads were inundated (Bloch, 2019).   
Transportation 
Taking a step back and moving away from agriculture, the damage to transportation 
infrastructure affected the entire region.  While water and debris clogged roads in the aftermath, 
the initial ice and flood pressure took down bridges.  The entirety of Boyd County, Nebraska, 
bordered by the Niobrara River, was stranded, accessible only via South Dakota or a small 
westward route into Keya Paha County, Nebraska (Salter, 2000).  Two main bridges that usually 
connected the county to the rest of the state were destroyed: a Highway 281 bridge and a 
Highway 12 bridge (Foster, 2020).  The U.S. Highway 281 bridge located downstream of 
Spencer Dam was destroyed in the moments after the dam failure and the resulting surge of ice 
and water.  Bridge replacements often take months to repair and in this case the bridge failure 





When roads flood, people are stranded.  When bridges disappear, communities are 
separated, the economy is disrupted, and it is hard for aid to enter the region and reach hard-hit 
areas.  Figure 6 shows one of the bridge failures in Nebraska.  This further exacerbates the 
challenges locals face in their recovery process.   
Water Infrastructure 
The interconnectedness of infrastructure networks means that the failure of one can lead 
to the collapse of another.  Water infrastructure often follows roads and is affected by the same 
hazards.  Additionally, water infrastructure into Boyd County to the north of the river was 
connected to the rest of the state in the south via pipes under the Niobrara River.  The pressure 
created by water and ice building up at the Spencer Dam when released by the dam failure was 
strong enough to destroy not just the aboveground bridges but also the underground pipes 
(Larson, 2019).  Local water storage tanks also were slammed into and destroyed in the 




aftermath of the dam failure (Yoders, 2019).  Following the disaster, the majority of the 
population who relied on the Boyd Country Rural Water District therefore found themselves 
without water for up to several months (Lindberg, 2020).   
Disasters exacerbate existing weaknesses.  The region’s water infrastructure was already 
stressed.  Prior to the Spencer Dam collapse, the Boyd County Rural Water District already 
“owned approximately $1 million in loans from their last expansion,” (Schurman, 2014).  The 
flood added another $2 million in damage costs, a high burden for a local government to bear but 
help from the state and national government is limited due to the widespread destruction the 
bomb cyclone caused. 
Other Physical Damage 
Throughout Boyd County, in addition to flooded roads and no usable water, towns and 
rural residents found themselves faced with many damaged buildings, both residential and 
commercial (Hammel, 2019B).  Figure 7 shows an arial view of the damage caused by the dam 
failure in surrounding regions.  The ice released from the dam and propelled by the built-up 
water pressure stripped trees in the region of their bark up to ten feet high (Genoways, 2019).  
Whether these trees survive this treatment can only be determined with time.   
 





While many of the structures and farms in the region downstream of the dam were 
affected, this cannot be blamed solely on the failure of Spencer Dam.  Buildings built not just in 
the dam inundation zone but in the natural flood plain would have been affected by the bomb 
cyclone even if the dam had not existed (ASDSO, 2020).  The type of flood onset may have 
differed, perhaps giving locals more warning that a flood was building up, but the entire 







CHAPTER 5.    SPENCER DAM: DISASTER PLANNING 
Emergency Management: An Overview 
A natural hazard and a natural disaster are not synonymous.  If a flood occurred in a 
region where there was no human settlements or activity, it would not be considered a disaster.  
Hazards exist in nature and it is only when humans interact with nature that hazards are turned 
into potential disasters.  In other words, the flood or earthquake is not the disaster, it is merely a 
hazard and how humans are affected, react, and cope determines if the event becomes a disaster 
(FEMA, 2016B).  For this reason, it has also been argued that there is no such thing as a 
“natural” disaster as by definition disasters are determined based on human activity and thus to 
some extent can be considered “man-made.”  After all, humans do not have to build in a flood 
zone or attempt to control a river with the addition of dams and other management techniques.  
Nonetheless, for the remainder of this paper the collapse of the Spencer Dam will be referred to 
as a natural disaster since the hazard was actualized and floods are commonly thought of and 
understood to be “natural” in contrast to the more traditional manmade disasters of terrorism and 
war.  “Emergency,” “emergency planning or management,” or simply “disaster management” is 
a neutral way to avoid the confusion between what is considered “natural” or not.  The National 
Incident Management System (NIMS) defines an emergency as “any incident, whether natural or 
manmade, that requires responsive action to protect life or property,” (FEMA, 2013B).  
Emergency management monitors all types of hazards and has three main stages.  The 
first in pre-event monitoring, planning, and readiness.  The second stage is the immediate post-
disaster response.  The last phase focuses on long term recovery and is tied into the first stage as 




components of the recovery process often overlap and are interconnected, with the actions in one 
stage affecting those in the next. 
Pre-Disaster Plans and Hazard Beliefs 
The roots of a successful recovery begin with pre-disaster preparedness and planning 
(FEMA, 2011).  There is a common idiom that states ‘an ounce of prevention is worth a pound of 
cure.’  In the given circumstances this argument is twofold.  If a community is able to 
successfully mitigate and manage hazards and prevent them from turning into disasters, past 
experience in the United States shows that the incurred cost of mitigation measures is, in the long 
run, more cost-efficient compared to the costs inflicted by many disasters.  But even if a disaster 
occurs and inflicts high levels of damage, pre-planning can help speed recovery and reduce 
wasted resources in the process, thereby reducing the cost of disasters to a community.  The 
ability to recover quickly after the disastrous is called resiliency and is what all disaster planning 
aims to achieve.   
The first step in pre-disaster planning is risk analysis (FEMA, 2015).  What threatens a 
community?  How bad is the hazard-turned disaster likely to be?  Are there multiple hazards 
threatening a community?  With hazards such as dams, which tend to be located outside of 
communities, threatening multiple communities at once, are locals even aware of the threat of 
dam failure?  Who controls these structures caught between communities or beyond urban 
boundaries?  Throughout the United States, when questioned most people answer that they have 
no personal awareness of threats posed by dams in their communities.   
Risk analysis and recognition feed into the policies and plans created prior to disasters.  
In regards to dams, the main three components are inspections, upkeep, and the creation and 
renewal of emergency plans of action (EPA).  These vary widely between states because while 




federal guidance on the matter.  While dam owners are responsible for initiating and completing 
inspections, the state often provides help (White, 2019).  Nebraska had regular inspections, led 
by the Nebraska Department of Natural Resources (NDNR or DNR).  The NDNR has just shy of 
3,000 dams they regularly inspect, averaging visits to 700 dams a year, resulting in these dams 
being inspected every few years (Yoders, 2019).  The most recent inspection Spencer Dam went 
through was in 2018, a year before its collapse.  Upkeep and renovations based on these 
inspections is far more varied.  With costs of maintenance falling to dam owners rather than 
government authorities, the ability or willingness to make repairs is left to the owner’s discretion.  
Spencer Dam was considered to be in “acceptable” condition at its last inspection.   
While Spencer Dam was in good standing regarding the first two components of pre-
dam-disaster planning, the dam did not have an emergency plan of action (EPA).  The EPA helps 
coordinate agencies across the region, creates communication networks, and provides clear steps 
and protocols to follow ahead of the often panicked disaster event (FEMA, 2011).   
Response 
Response refers to the immediate action taking during and after an incident.  Response is 
often confused with recovery and chronologically the two often overlap and blend together.  The 
main difference is that recovery is focused on long-term gains and goals whereas response is 
centered around immediate dangers (Library of Congress, n.d.).   
Response can best be seen by going through a timeline of the disaster.  The night of 
March 13 and the morning of March 14 saw the workers of the Nebraska Public Power District, 
the dam’s owner, fighting to weather the storm and attempting to keep the dam afloat, so to 
speak (Genoways, 2019).  Around 5:30 A.M. on March 14th one of the dam’s retention gates 
frozen close and the dam began to fail.  The workers determined that the dam was unsafe and 




they stopped at the house of Kenneth Angel at the base of the dam and yelled that he had to leave 
immediately (Genoways, 2019).  For whatever reason, he did not leave his house and was killed 
by the inundation following the dam collapse.  During this time, Becker, the Nebraska Public 
Power District’s media supervisor, was alerted that the dam had failed due to ice and increased 
water load.  By 10:30 A.M. “volunteer firefights from Lynch and neighboring communities” 
arrived with large trackers able to breach the high waters that had inundated surrounding regions 
and began the rescue and evacuation process of rural residents (Hammel, 2019B).   
The response to the Spencer Dam failure was complicated by the fact that it was not an 
isolated event.  The state of Nebraska was fighting floods across the state, resulting in strained 
state as well as federal responses.  “Officials from the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, the 
Nebraska Department of Natural Resources, the state’s biggest public power utility, and local 
fire departments were all overwhelmed by a combination of frozen ground, rain, and snow in 
mid-March,” (Yoders, 2019).  An initial needs assessment reported that the region surrounding 
the Spencer Dam required debris removal, the assessment of personal property for insurance 
purposes as well as the repair of said property, fencing and feed for the livestock that survived 
the storm, and veterinary services to help these animals, farm equipment replacement, temporary 
portable water delivery, and severe damage to the local transportation network (Lindberg, 2020).  
Along with the evacuation of humans, in the immediate aftermath the Nebraska National Guard 
flew feed to the herds they could see as normal food sources were either washed away or 




During the response phase, a call was issued by the Nebraska Department of Natural 
Resources, the regulatory authority of Spencer Dam, for an official investigation of the Spencer 
Dam failure.  Figure 8 compares before and after photos of the dam’s structure, capturing the 
level of destruction the dam suffered  The investigation was handed off to the Federal 
Emergency Management Association (FEMA) and the Association of State Dam Safety Officials 
(ASDSO) (Larson, 2019).  The 
group eventually selected to 
investigate the disaster was 
comprised of “retired members of 
the U.S. Corps of Engineers with 
a combined experience of 500 
years,” with specialists of 
“hydrology, mechanical, 
electrical, and civil engineering” 
coming together to provide a 
thorough assessment of the dam 
(Miles, 2019).  The investigation 
is intended to determine and learn 
from what went wrong to 
improve future dam management 
(Staff and Wire, 2019).   
Recovery  
The concept of what recovery consists of and when communities have officially 
‘recovered’ is a matter of debate and opinion.  With many disasters, there is a conflict between 
Figure 8: Before and after photos of Spencer Dam, 




quick recovery and the return to a sense of normalcy for those affected vs. building back better, 
reducing future vulnerability while also potentially solving long-standing issues in the 
community despite the increased time frame this requires.  However, realistically, the biggest 
problem for disaster recovery is the sheer economic cost involved.  By April 1, 2019, a few 
weeks after the bomb cyclone that battered the region, the state of Nebraska’s damage cost was 
$1.3 billion (Yoders, 2019).  President Trump made some federal recovery funds available and 
different federal and state departments and programs also provided aid for the sections of the 
country relevant to their mandate (Yoders, 2019).  For example, the Nebraska Farm Bureau 
Disaster Relief Fund allocated $3.4 million for damage relief (Lindberg, 2020).  However, 
donations and aid are hard-pressed to meet the entirety of the billion-dollar damage Nebraska 
alone incurred, with surrounding states taking similar damages in the storm.   
The destruction of Spencer Dam became a symbolic photograph of the 2019 bomb 
cyclone, as seen in Figure 9 (Hammel, 2019A).  The areas around the dam were slammed by ice, 
water, and debris such as sand that rivers normally carry along, creating a muddy, desolated 
background for these pictures.  The current owner of the Spencer Dam, the NPPD, had to decide 
if they were going to rebuild the dam.  Such a project would have to start from scratch, with the 
demolition of the remaining structure and meeting newer building standards that were developed 
over the last century.  Edward Sloan, the program delivery manager for FEMA, stated that the 
acquisition of completely new materials and implementation of current construction procedures 
would have to be followed if the owners wanted any aid from FEMA for the project (Larson, 
2019).  The other option would be to leave the river undammed, allowing it to return to its 
natural flow.  This option becomes more attractive when one considers that the path of the river 





the movement of secondary infrastructure such as roads and electrical equipment in order for the 
dam to function as it did previously (Larson, 2019) (Miles, 2019).  On top of this, this is a dam 
that the owners didn’t want, that they were in the process of selling and thus unlikely to spend 
the needed money rebuilding would require.  A year after the failure, Spencer Dam looks much 
the same as it did immediately after the bomb cyclone with the exception that “the highway just 
downriver now has a temporary bridge in place,” allowing for resumed movement between Boyd 
County and the rest of Nebraska (Foster, 2020).   
Despite the dearth of an Emergency Action Plan prior to the disaster, the common 
conclusion is that given the storm and the then capacity of Spencer Dam, the dam didn’t stand a 
chance and would have failed regardless (Pollock, 2019).  The questions that arise then are what  




components of planning and policy led to the dam failure?  What policies and plans were at fault 
and what worked as expected?  The next section will assess these questions and answer how 




CHAPTER 6.    ZOOMING OUT 
Spencer is not the only dam failure in the United States in recent years.  Press states that 
in the past four decades, 1,000 dams have failed, an average of 25 dam failures a year 
(Associated Press, 2019).  The year before the Spencer Dam failed, 2017, California’s Oroville 
dam broke (Leslie, 2019).  The report that came out at the time underlined the problem dam 
infrastructure across the country is facing and argued that change of some sort is necessary in 
order to avoid future disasters.  In regards to Oroville, “the fact that this incident happened to the 
owner of the tallest dam in the United States, under regulation of a federal agency, with repeated 
evaluation by reputable outside consultants, in a state with a leading dam safety regulatory 
program, is a wake-up call for everyone involved in dam safety,” (Leslie, 2019).  This is a hard 
argument to counter and raises concerns for the safety of dams with fewer resources and less 
stringent regulation.  There is a need to reassess how dams are measured, evaluated, and 
managed.  
Spencer Dam Overview 
The failure of Spencer Dam was decidedly not unexpected.  The collapse was not caused 
by negligence in yearly reviews and subsequent upkeep and improvements.  Indeed, the 
investigation report concluded that “there was nothing the operators at the dam could have 
done… that would have kept the dam from failing given the magnitude of the flood and ice run,” 
(ASDSO, 2020).  It was not due to human error such as complacency or overconfidence 
(ASDSO, 2020).  It was not due to lack of maintenance as for the previous 25 years inspections 
came back listing Spencer Dam as “well-maintained” (Hammel, 2019A).  So what went wrong? 
There is another idiom that goes “those who do not learn from history are doomed to 




unaware of the fact that ice can very much affect the dam’s operation. (ASDSO, 2020).  This 
ignorance was reemphasized by the fact that inspections often occurred in normal or best 
weather, not during the storms and ice season, thus failing to adjust the risk portfolio of the dam 
to include ice with these extreme winter weather events.   
Spencer Dam, like many dams across the United States, had a hazard potential 
classification rating assigned several decades ago.  More specifically, the U.S. Army Corps of 
Engineers’ National Dam Inspection Program in the early 1970s surveyed the dam, its 
surroundings, the risks associated with possible dam failure, and assigned the hazard rating 
accordingly (ASDSO, 2020).  Since this assessment, significant downstream development 
occurred but no new assessment was undergone. This is because ordering a new assessment 
within the system is cumbersome and would require significant justification.  Instead, it is 
normal for “state regulator(s) to treat that classification as one that needs no review or update, or 
to simply defer to the prior classification” (ASDSO, 2020).  The problems the Spencer Dam 
faced are endemic of the dams across the nation. 
Systemic Issues 
Nothing truly out of the normal policy or planning wise brought down the Spencer Dam, 
and this is worrying.  There was not some obvious problem such as lack of maintenance or 
structural damage.  The dam underwent regular inspection, acted to correct identified problems, 
and according to the Nebraska Department of Natural Resources was not in a location that the 
state was particularly worried about.  The state dam safety inspector, Tim Gokie, argued that the 
structure’s old age was not the reason for failure, at least not the primary reason.  Specifically, 
Gokie’s statement was:“ with age comes problems with any infrastructure – steel corrodes, 
concrete deteriorates over time.  But there’s no indication that any of that led to the failure of the 




say that we (Nebraska) have dams that are not well-maintained, but this was not one of them,” 
(Hammel, 2019A).  The review panel inspecting the dam’s collapse concluded: “that nothing 
they (the dam managers) could have done at the dam as configured at the time would have kept 
the dam from failing given the magnitude of the combined flood and ice run,” (ASDSO, 2020).  
However, there are common faults in the management of dam infrastructure within the United 
States that can be seen in the case study of the Spencer Dam failure and which are vital to begin 
taking into account for planning and policy.   
Historical Ignorance 
The inspection of Spencer Dam revealed that the dam operators knew that ice formed 
along the Niobrara River and these formations could impinge on a dam’s operations (ASDSO, 
2020).  But they knew nothing more than that.  Information about the interaction of ice and dams 
is rarely researched or communicated between dams, leading to a gap in operator knowledge 
(ASDSO, 2020).  However, it is not just that ice can impact dams but, more to the point, ice has 
impacted the Spencer Dam itself in the past and the current managers did not know this.  It was 
not until after the 2019 dam failure and the subsequent investigation that the Nebraska Dam 
Safety Program (NebDSP) gathered information on the 1935 Spencer Dam failure due to an ice 
run nor the later dam ice inflicted in 1960 and 1966 (ASDSO, 2020).  Prior to 2019, not even the 
dam’s owner – the Nebraska Public Power District – had a consolidated history of the Spencer 
Dam (ASDSO, 2020).  Thus the owners did not remember that not only were ice runs a plausible 
turn of events but a probable one in the current location.  While infrequent, this mode of failure 
was “foreseeable given the dam’s history,” (ASDSO, 2020).  This adds to the irony that in the 
immediate aftermath of the failure in 2019, Gokie, chief engineer of the state’s dam safety 
program, suggested that this “may be the first dam failure in the nation related to ice floes,” 




Technically, Spencer Dam followed regulations and took necessary actions.  What this 
indicates is that “dam inspections, while valuable, are not adequate dam safety evaluations in 
themselves,” (ASDSO, 2020).   Knowledge of local dam history is invaluable when preparing 
and planning for the future.  The records that survived from the 1966 ice incident describe “a 
wall of water and ice entering the reservoir,” a description that fits the events that occurred over 
50 years later in 2019 (ASDSO, 2020).   No comprehensive history of Spencer Dam was 
prepared until the 2019 failure investigation.  It is postulated that one of the causes behind this 
ignorance was that the current owner, the NPPD, took over the dam in 1970 may have forgone 
historical analysis of their new possession (ASDSO, 2020).  Past dam failures and damages are 
also known to destroy or damage records which also could have resulted in limited historic 
information.   
Inadequate Design & Project Life Expectancy  
Civil engineering projects, including dams, come with predicted life expectancies; 
anticipating when a structure will become unsafe as the materials used age and weather.  These 
life expectancies tend to be determined in decades rather than years.  However, when examining 
a structure that has been part of a community or landscape for 40 or 50 years, it is easy to assume 
the structure to be invulnerable, to assign it a description of an everlasting entity.  This is one of 
the reasons why dam failures so often come as complete surprises to communities, a hazard 
many had never thought about before as dams so often blend into the background, into the 
everyday and mundane. 
“By 2025, seven out of ten dams in the United States will be over 50 years old,” (ASCE, 
n.d.).  Even now, the average age of dams in the United States is 56 years (ASDSO, n.d. C).  
Considering that “many dams were designed with a 50-year design life” (emphasis added), these 




percentage of dams over 50 years old broken down by state.  With risk increasing as these 
structures age, the potential disasters associated with dams over the next few decades has 
skyrocketed.   Especially for those dams that now have large downstream communities where 
before few lived.  Adding to this is the fact that the surrounding environment changes over time 
as well.  Large swaths of the United States are grappling with increasing rain loads, often 
experienced in several extreme events rather than multiple smaller storms (FEMA, 2012B).  
Attempting to improve existing dams to measure up to these increased challenges is prohibitively 
expensive, especially for the majority of dams owned by private individuals rather than 
government agencies. 




In Nebraska alone, there are 1,200 dams over the age of 50 years old (Yoders, 2019).  
Spencer Dam was built in the 1920s.  That a dam designed to last 50-60 years made it to 92 years 
old before it finally failed actually conveys a favorable message about the engineering skills that 
kept it afloat and also speaks loudly of the neglect dams have received within the United States.  
Ultimately, the storm that spelled its downfall did so because it was completely out of 
possibilities the dam was built for (Hammel, 2019A).  A spokesman for the Nebraska Public 
Power District, Mark Becker, stated: “There needs to be a better understanding of what this 
facility was intended to be.  A lot of people, their thought was: ‘Wasn’t this supposed to control 
the flooding?’  When it was built in the ’20s, it was never ever designed to do that.  It’s a run-of-
the-river hydroelectric facility, and not a flood control operation,” (White, 2019).  In the 
introduction of this paper, the different uses of dams were discussed.  What was not mentioned is 
that most dams in the United States, regardless of original purpose or intended use, have now 
reverted to being, by default, part of the nation’s flood control management, regardless of 
matters of design.  Spencer Dam, a hydroelectric dam 30-40 years past its expected replacement 
date, failed in an extreme storm event.  When examined that way, the collapse was just a matter 
of ‘when,’ not ‘if.’   
Beyond life-span expiration date, there is the matter of inadequate design.  The 20th 
century was characterized by improved scientific understanding across all fields, an 
understanding that continues to improve in the 21st century.  Dams built today must meet new 
standards based on the scientific lessons learnt over the last several decades (FEMA, 2012B).  
Dams built a century ago can only hope to be lucky enough to have been built to withstand 
today’s challenges even when built based on less sophisticated science.  For example, 




existence has radically changed since the beginning of the 1900s, meaning the understanding of 
precipitation and floods has changed as well (Leslie, 2019).  Safety standards have also increased 
over the decades.  Dams built today have much higher standards to meet than those considered 
acceptable a hundred years ago and are sometimes ignored by modern regulations (source).  For 
example, the Spencer Dam was a hydroelectric dam but it outdated the Federal Energy 
Regulation Commission (FERC) and thus went unexamined by the commission (ASDSO, 2020).   
While some of the inadequacies dams possess can be attributed to limited scientific 
knowledge in the past, changing circumstances also leave dams blindsided and unable to cope.  
Climate change has played havoc with local environments, increasing extremes ecosystems and 
the infrastructure built within must face.  According to Gokie, head of the NDNR’s dam safety 
program, “the flood exceeded what the dam was designed to handle,” (Hammel, 2019A).  In 
other words, “the dam as configured was incapable of passing the flood and subsequently failed” 
(ASDSO, 2020).  If needed, the dam could pass large amounts of water, but ice floes and 
substantial amounts of river sediment pushed the hydroelectric dam too far (ASDSO, 2020).  The 
fact that Spencer Dam has a history of problems due to both ice and sediment returns to the 
earlier issue of historical ignorance by dam owners and operators which exaggerates the 
challenges of aging structures and changing circumstances.   
Downstream Construction 
The number of dams considered to be high-hazard is increasing in the United States.  
This despite the fact that few dams are still being built.  The weaknesses inherent in aging 
structures is worrisome but is not involved in this increase in numbers of high-hazard dams.   As 
hazard level is associated with the consequences of failure rather than the likelihood of failure, 
what matters is what is located within dam inundation zones.  Dams ‘tame’ the landscape 




Building around dams thus makes sense for developers.  Developers often “know nothing about 
the potential devastation an upstream dam could cause should it ever fail,” (ASDSO, n.d. C).  In 
other words, when considering where to live, people see the benefits but not the risks associated 
with these areas downstream of dams.  In 1999, there were 9,300 high-hazard dams spread across 
the United States.  By 2017, this number had grown to over 12,500 (Leslie, 2019).   
The new construction responsible for the increasing number of high-hazard dams does 
not happen all at once.  Often it occurs slowly, forming what is known as a ‘hazard creep’ as 
changes over years and decades add up and dams (or other structures) are “being relied upon to 
protect more and more people” in a particular area (Leslie, 2019) (Associated Press, 2019).  
Changes in nearby development mean that dam safety regulators should “periodically (re)assess 
the areas downstream of low and significant hazard dams,” (ASDSO, 2020).  Inundation maps, 
maps showing those areas predicted to be at risk should a dam fail, are useful ways to 
conceptualize risk and spread information to communities (FEMA, 2012A).  Spencer Dam did 
not have an inundation map (ASDSO, 2020).  This is in part because the last assessment of 
hazard risk for the dam was also the first, i.e. the initial one that occurred when the dam was built 
a century ago.   
The investigation of Spencer Dam’s failure found that the owner as well as state 
regulatory agencies “underestimated the potential of the life-threatening flooding to downstream 
houses and properties in the event of dam failure,” (ASDSO, 2020).  On record, Spencer Dam 
was considered to be a ‘significant hazard’ to the surroundings prior to the failure.  Taking into 
account downstream construction, the investigation panel determined that the dam was actually 
high-hazard, a difference emphasized by the fact that the dam collapse did result in death and 




considered to be high-hazard and the case study of Spencer Dam underlines the fact that even 
this increased number is not yet representative of reality.  How many dams in the United States 
would be added to the high-hazard list if there was widespread risk re-assessment?  Assessment 
does not change reality, these dams are still dangerous regardless, but assessment does affect 
how much evaluation and maintenance a dam receives. 
Externalities & Preparation for Worst Case Scenarios 
When a dam begins to fail in the middle of the night, in a blizzard, what actions might 
save the structure?  Who should be informed and in what order to get the most people to safety 
as possible?  Who begins the cleanup process?  A prepared document containing this information 
would be very helpful.  
Emergency Action Plans (EAPs) are detailed plans of action that should be taken should 
the worst happen.  EAPs are designed to “minimize the loss of life and property damage,” 
(FEMA, 2013B).  EAPs are complex, living documents and are only of use if regularly reviewed, 
updated, and practiced (FEMA, 2013B).  The average EAP has six components to be effective.  
The first lists pre-disaster mitigation efforts.  The second covers coordinated, regional responses 
to emergencies.  If a dam does fail, it is not just the dam owner that will be affected.  Creating 
networks with nearby authorities and first responders prior to actually needing them is crucial to 
a quick response.  The third component of an EAP outlines the actions owners will take to notify 
the surrounding populations should an incident occur.  To help coordinate and communicate risk, 
the fourth component of an EAP is an inundation map that visualizes risks and helps identify 
critical infrastructure in the danger zone.  The fifth section is the division of responsibilities 
between actors to provide an efficient, synchronized response. Lastly, as emergency action plans 
are living documents, there needs to be planned reviews meant to ensure the rest of the document 




The National Dam Safety Program would prefer for all dams to have an EAP, but in a 
country with 90,000 dams, choices of priority must be made (FEMA, 2013C).  High-hazard 
dams receive the brunt of focus as far as EAP planning is concerned as these are the dams that, if  
they failed, would likely result in death.  Unfortunately, dams are not always in the right hazard 
classifications and dams marked “significant risk” rather than “high hazard risk” are not required 
by regulation to have a working EAP.  Some dams create EAPs even if not required to do so, and 
Figure 11 shows the distribution of EAPs across hazard levels.  However, even if dams are not 
earmarked as “high hazard risk,” it is important to remember that there is no such thing as an 
infallible dam and where there’s a risk, appropriate planning and preparation needs to occur.  
With changing climatic conditions especially, the chances of dams being overwhelmed and 















Within the state of Nebraska, regulation dictates that 145 dams of high hazard 
classification must have an EAP prepared (White, 2019).  Of these dams, 97% have complied 
and now have a working EAP (White, 2019).  Nationally, Nebraska is ahead of the game as the 
country-wide average is only 77%, as of 2015 (ASCE, n.d.).  But when considering all dams 
within the state of Nebraska, not just the high-risk ones, only 80% have EAPs according to the 
most recent records collected by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (Associated Press, 2019).  
Hence why Spencer Dam did not have an EAP prepared that they could fall back on, although, 
had its hazard classification increased the state would have mandated the dam to create one. 
One final benefit provided by EAPs resides in the types of policy actors that it brings 
together (FEMA, 2013B).  The federal government can promote resiliency, provide funding, and 
allot economic disaster aid, but their role is limited when it comes to the immediate disaster 
(FEMA, 2013A).  The EAP forces dams to identify and form relationships with local authorities 
and critical first responders, relationships that usually do not exist, not in a sufficient form, 
without the trigger of an EAP.   
Emergency Action Plans prepare for worst-case scenarios, but they should not be the only 
preparatory action dams take regarding worst-case scenario planning.  It is important that dams 
correctly assess risks in order to take appropriate actions and know when the EAP might need to 
be used.  Spencer Dam ignored one crucial externality in their preparation and planning stage: 
the weather.  As the investigation puts it, “The location of Spencer Dam is subject to some of the 
most dynamic fluctuating weather patterns in North America.  This presents challenges for 
design and operation of infrastructure, such as the (Spencer) dam,” (ASDSO, 2020). 
The Niobrara River apparently has ice every winter, some winters are just more severe 




overlooking the threat of ice as this is apparently a common oversight in dams across the 
country, according to the Spencer investigation, but that does not make it less damning (ASDSO, 
2020).  The dam, as its managers correctly identified, was in good condition before the bomb 
cyclone.  It merely didn’t have any method at all to handle ice and keep it from building up 
upstream of the structure (ASDSO, 2020).  No person or technical system was monitoring ice 
conditions upriver (ASDSO, 2020).  The dam merely acted as if ice were not of its concern.  
How could the inspections every couple of years miss this threat?  Even without historical data to 
underscore how damaging ice could be, the threat should have been spotted.  Worst-case 
scenario planning, in this case, was undermined by one important fact – inspections at Spencer 
Dam occurred in warm weather, out of season with the river’s ice formations (ASDSO, 2020).  
Out of sight, out of mind. 
Giving the inspectors and operators a reprieve, it is worthwhile to note that before 2019, 
very few people knew what a bomb cyclone was, let alone how to prepare for it.  A common 
question asked when examining events such as the polar vortex, bomb cyclone, and derecho that 
have hit the Midwest one after the other is, “Is this the new normal?” (Genoways, 2019).  With 
predictions of future conditions often based on past accounts, how does one plan around change?  
Additionally, how does the United States prepare for climate change and the extremes in brings 
when the federal government, as often as not, denies the effects of climate change?   The worst-
case scenario is becoming more extreme and less predictable, but planners nonetheless need to 
recognize this fact and increase the robustness of their disaster plans.   
False Confidence 
There is a commonly held belief that infrastructure is invulnerable and infallible.  This 
preconception is one of the reasons developers build in dam inundation zones.  An employee of 




overconfident in the human ability to control and remake the environment (Kelley, 2019).  Even 
should locals be aware of dams and the potential disaster they embody, it is easy to “be overly 
confident in the infallibility of these manmade structures,” as a dam that lasts decades, as most 
dams do, can take on the attributes of immortality (ASDSO, n.d. C).  As FEMA warns, “the most 
important steps someone can take to protect themselves from dam failure is to know their (own) 
risks,” (emphasis added) (FEMA, 2016A).  Figure 12 shows the distribution of high, significant, 
and low-risk dams across the United States.  
 
 
There are many culprits for this overconfidence and ignorance, but in the last two 
decades there has been a systematic concealment of information by the federal government 
(Leslie, 2019).  After September 11, 2001, the government located the country’s key 
infrastructure, which includes the dam network spanning the nation, and retrieved and hid public 
information regarding these critical infrastructure structures (Associated Press, 2019).  
Considering that this information included not just the locations of dams but the hazard 




classifications of dams, based on the predicted death toll failure could create, and the years of 
heightened fear following 9/11, it is perhaps not surprising that the federal government classified 
such information.  Over the years, as the threat of terrorism on the scale seen in 2001 decreases, 
information regarding dams has slowly been made public again.   
Even so, the aftershocks of 9/11 continue to affect dam infrastructure.  While it is unclear 
how many developers and citizens knew of the dams in their area prior to 2001, today, after 
years where this information was not accessible, the number of people unknowingly living in 
inundation zones is considerable.  But in addition, on a national level rather than an individual 
scale, the policy conversation shifted.  The increased interest in dam safety and related 
regulations that began in the 1970s and lasted through the 1990s has lessened, with Congress 
instead focusing on “securing and protecting” dams and the water sources connected to them 
(Lane, 2006).  Incidents like New Orleans’ levees failing in Hurricane Katrina are reminders that 
the physical condition of these structures are important and the country is now attempting to 
figure out a balance between security and maintenance when it comes to dams (Lane, 2006).   
In regards to Spencer Dam, the investigation panel identified two main faults regarding 
the dams fostering of community knowledge of potential risks.  The weaknesses of dams bleed 
into each other and inaction in one circumstance can result in cascading effects.  Without an 
emergency action plan, the operators on duty the night of the disaster did not know how to 
contact the community effectively during a time-sensitive crisis (ASDSO, 2020).  This lack of 
communication efforts was present before the failure as well.  Dams ideally should have 
community engagement and education sessions so that locals can prepare for dams breaks like 
they prepare for tornadoes or fires (ASDSO, 2020).  Not doing so leads to an inaccurate portrayal 




Ignorance, false confidence, and poor planning combine to create a dangerous situation.  
Even with the establishment of better warning systems, there is only so much one can hope for 
when people don’t know how they are supposed to respond to dam failures.  Mistakes and poor 
decisions are almost guaranteed.  The economic loss will also be higher in those communities 
that are blindsided by the dam collapse compared to those who knew beforehand and took 
actions to mitigate damages from possible disasters (FEMA, 2012A).  Risk communication is the 
key ingredient to counter false confidence and prepare locals to react appropriately when dams 
fail (FEMA, 2018).   
Lack of Resources 
Dams in the United States experience a trifecta of resource shortages: aging 
infrastructure, little governmental funding for upkeep or upgrades, and overworked and 
insufficient dam inspection boards.  Of these, aging infrastructure has already been discussed.  
Overworked dam safety staff is related to the lack of government funding and so will be 
examined first.   
There are 90,000 dams in the United States that need to be overseen, reviewed, and 
managed.  These dams are aging and facing greater climatic stress making oversight crucial.  
“State dam safety programs need to balance workload with quality of work” in order to inspect 
as many dams as possible (ASDSO, 2020).  But even though inspections have improved and the 
review progress has been streamlined, the final step, fixing the actual issue rather than merely 
identifying it, is where the progress falls short.  At this point, Congress would need to allocate 
billions of dollars to rectify the problems that safety staff have identified, and so far Congress 
does not seem interested (Leslie, 2019).   
The review process varies state by state as there is no federal standard that must be met 




responsibility of inspecting dams, with some states creating more stringent requirements than 
others.  On average, in the United States dam inspectors are each charged with 200 dams to keep 
track of (Leslie, 2019).  Each state has around 8 employees dedicated to dam inspection and the 
average number of regulated dams is 1,600 (ASDSO, n.d. C).  Some states are better than others, 
increasing the number of employees working on dam safety.  Who becomes a dam inspector also 
varies.  While it is not necessary for inspectors to have a background in engineering to review 
normal dams, it would certainly be helpful.  Dams classified as possessing a ‘high hazard risk’ 
must be reviewed by engineers, but states can find it hard to attract and keep engineers (ASDSO, 
2020). 
One of the reasons is that state dam safety programs lack funds.  This is another metric 
that varies greatly between states, “ranging from less than $50 per state-regulated dam to more 
than $16,000 per dam,” (Lane, 2006).  Assessing dams cost money.  Fixing problems cost 
money.  Improving policy and planning costs money (ASDSO, n.d. C).  With the majority of 
dams owned by private individuals, who are in charge of organizing inspections and repairs, the 
amount the owners can contribute is limited which limits the activities available at that particular 
dam (ASCE, n.d.). 
Lack of investment on a wider scale has resulted in disrepair accumulating.  Over time, 
repeated failure to solve issues while they are small has resulted in the issues growing, placing 
the dam in a precarious place (Genoways, 2019).  This neglect is one of the reasons why the 
number of high hazard dams is increasing.  Jacques Leslie referred to the current situation as 
being caused by  “a huge backlog of rehabilitation (of) needs regarding dams in our country,” 
(Leslie, 2019).  Not only do dams cease to function properly, impacting their ability to fulfill 




With each delay in investment, the need for increased funding grows (Kriley, 2019).  The 
Association of State Dam Safety Officials “estimates (that at this point) it would take more than 
$70 billion to repair and modernize our dam infrastructure” (Associated Press, 201).  The need 
for increased resources plagues every state (Associated Press, 2019).   
The question then becomes: how can the funds be acquired to meet dam infrastructure 
demands?  Policy and finance are inextricably entwined.  Private owners cannot shoulder the 
burden alone when the costs can range from a few thousand to several million.  Local 
governments do not have the budget to meet these needs, especially for those dams outside city 
limits.  Even state governments, those responsible for dam oversight and inspections,  struggle to 
allocate funds for dam maintenance.  A dozen states have experienced decreases in spending on 
dam programs over the last decade, despite no decrease in responsibilities (Associated Press, 
2019).  “Many states are simply under-resourced for carrying out the letter of the law,” (ASDSO, 
n.d. C).  In 2018, Alabama allocated no funds towards dam safety, California designated $21.3 
million towards safety initiatives, and the other states fell somewhere between these extremes, 
many tending more towards Alabama than California (ASDSO, n.d. C).   
It is therefore up to the federal government who has the budget needed to address the 
state of disrepair dam infrastructure is slowly succumbing to (ASDSO, 2019).  A Congressional 
Research Service report examines what motivates Congress when it comes to dam safety and 
consolidated the considerations into three categories: “(1) dam security and the potential for acts 
of terrorism at major U.S. dam sites; (2) prevention of potential dam failures due to structural 
deficiencies; and (3) recovery from dam failures,” (Lane, 2006).  The federal government is one 
of the main actors in building large infrastructure projects and funding their general upkeep, 




funding, there “exists no federal funding to rehabilitate most dams in the U.S.” (ASDSO, 2019).  
Until Congress puts needed funds into the system, addressing the current repair problems, major 
policy changes and safety regulations improvements will not occur (Leslie, 2019).   It is 
important to note that while it is easy to refer to federal level involvement as “Congress” since 
Congress is the one who controls the final federal budget and passes national legislation, the 
federal level involvement with dams is highly fractured.  Some dams are overseen by the 
Department of Agriculture, some by the Department of Energy, some by the Department of 
Water Resources, some by the National Parks Service.  Even dividing by sectors such as this 
oversimplifies the mess of confusion that is federal oversight of dams.  Funding dam 
improvements would be considerably easier if there were only one or two national-level 
departments or agencies that oversaw dams.   
As events such as the Spencer Dam failure in 2019 become more common, public 
pressure is likely to mount and eventually Congress will act (Lane, 2006).  At some point, the 
short term repair costs will become cheaper than the otherwise short and long term disaster costs.  
Changing Environment 
The last overarching problem facing dams today is climate change.  Climate change is 
intimately connected to water, with the geographical location determining if areas experience 
these changes either as droughts or as floods.  One of the principal concerns for the 21st century 
is the threat of freshwater shortages.  As such, many inventions have been made to increase 
water efficiency and these concepts and designs are spreading across not just the United States 
but the world at large.  But drought, water shortages, is only part of the current dilemma.  After 
the failure of Spencer Dam, John Mitchell, the director of alternative delivery at the engineering 
firm Burns & McDonnell, summarized the current policy issue: “When we talk about water 




focused so much on water resiliency being drought resiliency,” (Yoders, 2019).  But climate 
change has a way of normalizing extreme weather, consolidating a region’s yearly rainfall into a 
handful of extreme events (Leslie, 2019).  This concentration of rainfall leads to mass flooding 
and water infrastructure, such as dams, having to handle increased flow load potentials.  The 
United States Bureau of Reclamation only predicts future difficulties when it comes to increased 
flow loads across the nation.  The average increase of upper-basin runoff is a “6% average 
annual increase, with the number rising to 10% increase in runoff,” (Pollock, 2019).  These 
enlarged flow loads aid in weathering and stressing water infrastructure, reducing its lifespan 
(DeGood et al., 2016).   
If the increase in rainfall occurred steadily throughout the year, with only minute changes 
noticeable at any given time, increased loads might not be a problem.  However often this change 
in rainfall is experienced through extreme weather events that deposit large amounts of rain in 
short periods of time, overloading the region’s drainage system, including dams.  FEMA has 
warned the country that “even if kept in good condition, thousands of dams could be at risk 
because of extreme rainstorms,” (Associated Press, 2019).  An example of the increasing 
frequency of extreme events can be seen across the country as communities experience ‘100-
year’ and ‘500-year’ floods, events that, based on historical inferences, were thought to have a 
1% or a .05% chance of occurring each year, now hit communities every decade or two 
(Genoways, 2019).  The Midwest or Northern Great Plains area is repeatedly hit by storms 
which, depending on local temperature, can either bury communities in snow or drown them 
with rain (ASDSO, 2020).  With such varied weather possibilities, planners need to be prepared 




“stand the test of time, which increasingly will include the worst impacts of climate change,” 
(Cassidy & DeGood, 2019). 
The presence of ice, specifically, has strong connections to changing temperatures.  The 
investigation carried out at Spencer Dam after its failure found next to no research or knowledge 
regarding how ice formed on the Niobrara River, with a dearth of information both in regards to 
braided river formations and in regards to rivers in general facing these weather conditions in the 
center of the country (ASDSO, 2020).  Similar conditions have been known to create ice jams on 
rivers, but the incident at Spencer Dam, with the following investigation, is now the most well-
documented instance and can help other dams prepare for similar conditions in the future 
(ASDSO, 2020). 
Spencer Dam, located on the Niobrara River, is part of the larger Missouri River 
watershed.  A map of the Missouri Water Basin has been included in Figure 13.  John Remus, 
the person in charge of the 
Army Corps of Engineers’ 
Missouri River Basin division, 
has already seen the impacts of 
climate change and predicts 
more frequent disasters in the 
future, be it “longer and more 
severe floods” or “longer and 
more severe droughts” as the 
region is expected to alternate 
between the two extremes 





(Kelley, 2019).  To put this into perspective, the Missouri River watershed drains 10 states and 
two Canadian provinces.  The controls and engineering manipulations humans installed to 
regulate the river are now outdated, built for different conditions based on different, now 
outdated, science concepts.  The system is struggling and in 2019, Mr. Remus had “nothing but 
bad options” when faced with the weather events afflicting the river system that year (Kelley, 
2019).  When faced with only bad options, it is time for significant infrastructure change in how 
water is managed.   
Spencer Dam Revisited 
Damage to dams via ice has occurred before, albeit rarely, but the complete collapse of 
Spencer Dam to ice was an eyeopener for the country.  There are environmental lessons that 
need to be carried over from this incident to other dams in ice prone areas of the country.  
Especially as state dam safety inspector Gokie has stated that “ice jams and floes are rarely 
considered in safety assessments,” (Hammel, 2019A).  Despite this important identification of 
future environmental hazards, the main lessons from Spencer Dam are not climate-related but 
rather center around policy and planning concerns.  More comprehensive planning needs to be 
undertaken at dams, planning that looks into not just the dam’s past but also current and future 
developments, making note of and acting to reduce newly identified risks.  An easy method of 
trying to solve these problems is to throw money at it and hope the concerns disappear.  While 
money is generally lacking and very much needed to keep the system running, alone it is not 
enough.  More thoughtful answers are needed for long term solutions.  In order to simply keep 
the current infrastructure network running, more funds are needed for basic maintenance and 
improvement.  Local planning also needs to help develop local awareness and education of 





CHAPTER 7.    DISCUSSION & ACTION PLAN 
Future Problems 
There are three main problems facing the United States’ current dam infrastructure 
network: 1) the high financial cost resulting in policy deficit and thus increased risk, 2) the risk 
presented in interconnected systems, and 3) dangerous development. 
Future Problem #1: High Financial Cost and Resulting Policy Deficit Accompanied by 
Increased Risk 
According to Press, “1,000 dams have failed over the past four decades,” (Associated 
Press, 2019).  In 2019, when the Spencer Dam failed, there were 1,688 high-hazard dams in 
dangerously poor condition, and this was just the number from states who actually turned in 
documentation to the federal government (Associated Press, 2019).  Dams have been left to their 
own devices mainly due to the economic cost of actually beginning the improvement process.   
There are around 87,500 non-federal dams in the United States, 14,000 of which are considered 
high-hazard.  An additional 4,000 dams are federally owned.  Together, the cost of rehabilitation 
is around $70 billion (ASDSO, 2019).  “The question is, how much money are we willing to 
spend to make sure that any river in the state is flood proof?  I’m not sure you could even come 
up with that kind of money and I think that would be a very difficult thing to do, ” (Gordon & 
Schleicher, 2015).  It is a question that is at the root of every discussion regarding flooding and 
infrastructure: how much are we willing to spend?  Even focusing on high-hazard dams alone, 
the United States would still need to locate around $22 billion, an estimate that continues to 
increase as disrepair builds up (Kriley, 2019).  But despite their names, high-hazard dams are 
only part of the problem.  Spencer Dam was not of high-hazard and it still failed and killed 
somebody.  So, in this case, what counts as ‘high hazard?’  Approaching the problem using a 




Engineers has stated their maintenance bill alone has reached $25 billion (ASCE, n.d.).  At 
current rates of spending, the expected finish date for improvements required by army dams is 50 
years away.   
Programs such as the Water Infrastructure Improvements for the Nation Act (WIIN) may 
be developing a structure for future governmental actions, but with a lack of funding this act 
remains more of a thought exercise than a working plan of action from the federal government 
(ASCE, n.d.).  2015 saw a 10% increase in state dam program spending from 2011, adding $50 
million to their dam regulatory programs but as the need is measured now in billions rather than 
millions the effects of these funds has been minimal (ASCE, n.d.). 
It is hard to get the public interested in dam infrastructure and well-being.  This in turn 
makes it difficult to create the pressure necessary for policy improvements to be created.  As 
federal spending comes from the head of government rather than from states, public pressure 
leading to public policy is the main trigger for money to be added to the system and 
improvements to be made.  This challenge merges into the invisibility of infrastructure by the 
general public unless it fails.  Ideally, it will not have to reach such a dangerous precipice before 
officials start paying attention. 
Future Problem #2: Interconnected Systems 
Dam failures and the resulting flood events tend to trigger cascading secondary disasters.  
Infrastructure systems in the United States are intertwined and when one comes down it tends to 
bring others with it (ASCE, n.d.).  Floodwaters can take out bridges and inundate roads, thereby 
temporarily taking nearby transportation infrastructure out of commission.  Power lines can be 
taken down, water sources polluted, and washed up garbage and chemicals spread throughout the 




considerably increase recovery costs.  This is one of the reasons why failure is significantly more 
expensive than continuous dam improvements.  
Beyond financial strain, secondary infrastructure failures severely hamper the logistics 
involved in response and recovery efforts as areas often become stranded.  This affects supplies 
into communities and the ability for travel within communities.  Disruptions to transportation 
networks also derail local economies and the repercussions of this are felt far into the future.  
“Many supply chains rely on multiple modes of transportation, and no single mode has enough 
redundancy to accommodate the goods of another,” (Kelley, 2016).  Considering that the local 
economy is one of the most important factors for successful long term recovery, repairing 
infrastructure systems beyond the dam itself is crucial.   
Even in cases where there are no causalities, the initial rapid flood wave that radiates out 
after a dam’s collapse combines with lack of power and often water, and this double hit brings a 
community to its knees.  Planning ahead of time to identify likely cascading infrastructure 
failures and creating action-plans for how to get them running as soon as possible needs to be 
part of community emergency action plans when examining possible dam failure.   
Future Problem #3: Dangerous Development 
There is an increasing number of high-hazard dams in the United States.  Surprisingly, 
this is not necessarily due to aging infrastructure or changing climates.  Instead, dam hazard 
increases based on the number of people downstream who will be affected by dam failure.  Thus 
the trend of increasing development in flood zones in general, not just dam inundation areas, is 
greatly increasing the risks that the inhabitants must live with every day.  For example, the 
investigation in Spencer Dam noted that, “if the dam were not there (never built or removed), the 
highway and local buildings would likely have been washed downstream” anyway as they were 




(temporary) impediment of Spencer Dam (ASDSO, 2020).  But in the actual circumstances, the 
presence of the dam and the automatic risk that it might one day fail should have been enough of 
a threat that nearby building would occur in safer areas.  The investigation’s exact statement was 
“it would be difficult to conclude that the area between the dam and Highway 281 was a safe 
place for a permanent residence,” (ASDSO, 2020). 
The problem of dangerous development occurs across the United States, be it building 
along river flood plains or in coastal communities faced with sea level rise and increased 
frequency of large storms.  Water based disasters, flood disasters, are going to continue 
occurring in the United States unless these reckless development practices are curbed.  Building 
in flood zones occurs in part because federal flood insurances mitigates the potential costs of an 
actual flood at the individual level.  It is not uncommon, in the wake of disasters, for 
development to occur in the same location that is identical to what was there prior to the disaster 
and thus has all the same vulnerabilities and will thus be impacted similarly in the next disaster.  
Even though currently there are no plans to rebuild Spencer Dam, the area around is still a flood 
plain and recovery needs to build back better, build back smarter, for recovery to be deemed a 
success.  Relocation is a valid part of recovery and needs to receive more recognition as a 
possible solution for future hazard risk reduction.   
Potential Solutions 
The last decade of federal politics has been characterized by gridlock, increasing party 
divides, and ineffectiveness.  Fortunately, infrastructure improvement is one of the few popular 
issues that enjoys a bipartisan consensus that improvements are needed (Committee for 
Economic Development of the Conference Board, n.d).  On the other hand, this consensus has 




managed to be passed have not been able to measure up to the actual demand from the various 
infrastructure sectors.   
In 2016, a Gallup Poll found that 75% of respondents favored increased federal spending 
on infrastructure (Newport, 2020).  Many polls have shown similar results.  It is impossible to 
talk solely about one type of infrastructure without taking into account the other, interconnected 
systems.  Infrastructure networks in the United States are all facing the same lack of funding and 
dearth of policy.  With the systems as entwined as they are, this section will lump all networks 
under the general term of ‘infrastructure.’  Infrastructure improvements and investments would 
affect the daily life of people, it provides “tangible results” that would have long lasting benefits 
(Newport, 2020), but infrastructure policy is hindered by one crucial factor: construction projects 
take years and significant progress will likely not be noticed until years down the road, beyond 
the next election cycle.  And so “infrastructure today (remains) both an all-encompassing 
solution and an omnipresent problem, indispensable yet unsatisfactory, always already there yet 
always an unfinished work in progress,” and thus it remains a topic discussed but rarely acted 
upon (Edwards et al., 2009).  This could always change, for example in 2019 President Trump 
and House Speaker Pelosi with Senate Minority Leader Schumer verbally agreed to allocate $2 
trillion to infrastructure improvements (Newport, 2020).  This is not a plan nor anywhere close to 
a policy, but an agreement on importance is at least a beginning. 
The problem is that a final dollar amount alone does not actually fix the issue.  To be sure 
financial aid is needed, but throwing money towards infrastructure only gets the country so far.  
The conversation needs to be refocused from total spending to questions about “how much 
infrastructure do we get for our money?” (Gordon & Schleicher, 2015).  Infrastructure is 




why this is so and no conclusive answer, but the effectiveness of government spending and the 
efficiency of infrastructure improvements needs to be considered when making relevant policy 
decisions (Gordon & Schleicher, 2015).  However, despite the high cost of infrastructure the 
United States is wealthy enough that the cost is immaterial if the political will for action is strong 
enough (Cassidy & DeGood, 2019).  And the political will needs to be strong - a general 
consensus that change is needed is not enough - because the American Society of Civil 
Engineers predicts that in the next decade, government spending at current levels will fall short 
of infrastructure needs by $2 trillion (Cassidy & DeGood, 2019).  This is an intimidatingly large 
amount of money but when examined at a nation-level scale it is more manageable, for example 
the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act (TCIA) passed in 2017 resulted in a tax cut of $1.9 trillion (Cassidy & 
DeGood, 2019).  Clearly this amount of money can be allocated by the United States government 
towards specific endeavors, be it the TCIA or a policy to revamp national infrastructure systems. 
A concern that arises when countries move this amount of money around is that the 
money must be allocated with equity and inclusiveness in mind from the start (Cassidy & 
DeGood, 2019).  Improving infrastructure of only specific regions of the country has lasting 
impacts on overlooked communities and makes the country as a whole weaker.  Many 
infrastructure systems currently require or will soon require a large systemic overhaul to 
continue being functional and this presents the perfect opportunity to reexamine current planning 
procedures (Nellenbach et al., 2019).  “The needs to reverse years of this underinvestment in 
infrastructure, despite tighter budgets at every level of government, calls for us to rethink how 
we pay for and manage infrastructure,” (Department of the Treasury, 2014).  What priorities are 
to be emphasized?  What should the country look like going forward?  Are there ideas that 




example, the United States has decided to stop building new dams so planning needs to focus on 
the end of a dam’s lifespan rather than its beginnings. 
There are many different options for how the government can go forward from here, 
different steps they can take to help alleviate the problem of aging infrastructure.  The problem 
of infrastructure improvement is complex and each of the options listed below only chip away at 
the problem, attempting to make it more manageable.  None of the options listed below are 
exclusive and since they can easily be combined. 
An initial step, one that ought to be taken before any major decisions are made, is to 
improve the data collection and analysis of information regarding infrastructure in order to make 
informed decisions.  From a disaster management point of view, “better data is needed to 
evaluate risk  and develop new insurance products,” (Kunreuther et al., 2018).  From a planning 
point of view, it is important to know what works and what does not work.  Collecting data also 
allows researchers to develop better infrastructure models for future investments. 
A second decision that could be made is the choice to stop deferring maintenance.  There 
are many reasons why crumbling infrastructure is undesirable.  From a disaster management 
perspective, it is preferred if basic amenities such as bridges or dams do not collapse.  There are 
also economic considerations to take into account when discussing infrastructure failures.  
Failures are often accompanied by delays in services and with the mindset that “time is money,” 
the costs of these delays begin to add up (Nellenbach et al., 2019).  Additionally, older 
infrastructure also often is not only environmentally unfriendly but is more prone to problems 
and delays (Nellenbach et al., 2019).  Slowly phasing these older structures out of use and 
replacing them with newer, more efficient versions is both cost friendly but also less damaging 




as they go.  On a national scale, reducing deferments in favor of continuous maintenance is 
expensive and will require federal funding as city and even state governments do not have access 
to a sufficient amount of resources to handle the current backlog of problems.  However, there 
are actions that can be taken on the local level that would help the situation.  As seen when 
looking at the history of Spencer Dam, many communities do not require comprehensive reports 
of the infrastructure assets near them, sometimes missing assets completely, other times, like 
with Spencer Dam, missing crucial information about infrastructural risks.  As the Bipartisan 
Policy Center explains, “This inhibits the ability of public agencies to make strategic decisions 
about how and where to deploy their limited funds, and masks potential opportunities for 
innovative solutions,” (Nellenbach et al., 2019). 
These first few options act as preventative measures meant to limit further problems from 
developing.  The next option examines a method of addressing the current problems, focusing on 
the main roadblock created by current and future funding demands.  With individual owners 
lacking the means to act independently, city and state governments stretched for resources, and 
the federal government unable to find political motivation to act, communities have started 
looking for other sources of funding.  One method of securing funding for infrastructure projects 
that has become increasingly widespread over the years and which is garnering considerable 
attention from the research community is the adoption of public-private partnerships (PPPs).  
These partnerships are “not a substitution for government spending on infrastructure” but rather 
meant to aid governments by providing funding and helping ensure the funds are used efficiently 
(Department of the Treasury, 2014).  By splitting the risk that accompanies any large project, 
private firms help reduce the pressure on governments, reduce the amount of money required for 




quality (Department of the Treasury, 2014).  While PPPs are still relatively rare in the United 
States, they are common in Australia, Canada, and the United Kingdom.  In other words, the 
countries most similar to the United States are all making use of PPPs to help finance 
infrastructure roles. 
In regards to utilizing these partnerships, Australia is only about a decade further down 
the road than the United States.  In 2008, faced with the threat that “inadequate infrastructure 
could limit (their) economic growth,” the country reorganized how infrastructure was handled 
and began national level planning (Tan, 2017).  The country “brought together the public and 
private sectors to devise a long-term strategy and prioritize key projects for funding,” (Tan, 
2017).  As important as the tangible results have been since then, equally important was that in 
having had these discussions, planning could adjust and better satisfy current infrastructure 
needs.  The United States is in a similar position now to Australia in 2008.  The United States, 
however, has the advantage that both political parties already agree that infrastructure 
improvement is important. Now there just needs to be discussion and agreement on how to 
achieve these improvements and where to start.  With many debates in the United States 
government being split along economic lines – i.e., how should government projects be funded 
and where should the money come from – appealing to private firms for partnerships and 
reducing the amount of funding required from the government might alleviate some of the 
current debate differences.  Australia found that changing how infrastructure was understood, 
purchased, and funded helped them modernize their infrastructure systems and the mechanism 




success in Australia as well as its presence in the United Kingdom and Canada, these 
partnerships are worth considering as the United States begins to address mounting infrastructure 
needs. 
While public-private partnerships have the potential to alleviate or delay the need for 
government spending on infrastructure improvements, there are drawbacks to this type of 
proposal as well.  Currently, the United States is overwhelmed with infrastructure projects 
requiring attention and resources.  Splitting the cost with private firms can lessen the financial 
burden the government faces today and help achieve needed infrastructure improvements, but 
eventually private firms will expect to be reimbursed, either by the government or by the 
project’s consumers (Whitmore Schanzenbach et al., 2017).  Like other forms of loans, there is 
“a cost attached to debt” that will eventually have to be paid (World Bank Group, 2016).  In 
other words, PPPs are a possible solution for spreading infrastructure costs over time to make it 
more manageable. 
Other drawbacks include the fact that any contract with private companies requires 
detailed contracts outlining expectations and reimbursements prior to the project beginning.  This 
rigidity can be challenging should unexpected situations occur over the course of construction 
(World Bank Group, 2016).  While private firms have incentives to be as efficient as possible, 
government oversight would be required to ensure honesty and high standards (Whitmore 
Schanzenbach et al., 2017).  By entering into a PPP, the government is signing its name to the 
end product and thus taking responsibility for its success or failure. 
PPPs are also only applicable to certain types of projects.  When the United States 
government finally begins large scale work on infrastructure improvements, it will likely start 




several years ago years, Spencer Dam likely would not have received attention or funds due to its 
risk classification as well as its relatively small stature (World Bank Group, 2016).  However, 
logically it can be assumed that any method that can make the government’s funds stretch further 
increases the likelihood that smaller dams and other infrastructure edifices will be attended to 
and improved. 
Saving Today in Order to Build Tomorrow 
Infrastructure maintenance and planning create results that last years if not decades.  
Infrastructure, the base of current lifestyles, shapes how people act and will act going forward.  
As the Center for American Progress argues, infrastructure “represent(s) the direction the 
country should take,” (Cassidy & DeGood, 2019).  For example, at the beginning of the 1900s 
the United States decided to build roads.  To this day, the United States is dominated by 
automobiles rather than trains or bicycles.  The decision to invest in roads rather than alternative 
infrastructure changed cities and changed human habits.  Lifestyle, living standards, as well as 
equity and social mobility are all heavily dependent on the ubiquity of quality infrastructure 
(Cassidy & DeGood, 2019).  Infrastructure and the connected services can draw people to 
countries or repulse them.  Beyond individual experience, infrastructure systems are also 
essential for modern economies (Committee for Economic Development of the Conference 
Board, n.d). 
Failing infrastructure is not just a safety hazard.  Crumbling infrastructure has effects on 
a nation’s economy.  “Deteriorating infrastructure… has a cascading impact on the nation’s 
economy, negatively affecting business productivity, gross domestic product (GDP, 
employment, personal income, and international competitiveness,” (ASCE, 2013).  Current 
infrastructure deficiencies need to be addressed in order to fix current safety hazards and future 




infrastructure investment is uniquely suited to fix modern problems such as “increasing wages, 
rebuilding struggling communities, and decarbonizing the economy,” (Cassidy & DeGood, 
2019).  The decisions the United States makes today will play out in the future of how the 
country functions and what issues continue to affect the nation. 
Moving Forward From Spencer Dam 
Dam failures occur only once, meaning that communities cannot build experiential 
learning for the next incident.  It is therefore crucial for communities to learn from dam failures 
elsewhere.  While dam failures are rare, each dam is at risk of one day collapsing and the 
consequences of the collapse can be severe (Office of the New York State Comptroller, 2018).  
Thus dam failures are “low probability but high consequence,” which presents unique planning 
challenges (FEMA, 2013D).   
Planning and policy decisions contributed to the failure of the Spencer Dam in Nebraska 
in 2019, but this failure was characteristic of systemic weaknesses across the country. Ignorance, 
false confidence, erroneous risk perceptions and predictions, and lack of resources have worked 
together to create an unacknowledged vulnerability throughout the dam infrastructure in the 
United States.  Infrastructure vulnerabilities are often only realized when the infrastructure 
system stops working, but when dams stop working it is too late to realize the existence of 
unnoticed risks, such as ice buildups, that can cause a dam to fail in extreme weather. 
Planning needs to evolve to adopt revised risk analysis procedures that include a 
changing environment and extreme weather events in the predictions of the future.  Policy needs 
to act on the public desire for improved infrastructure and begin allotting time and money to fix 
dilapidated infrastructure systems.  The cost is high, but the federal government can afford it by 
changing its priorities, and improving the systems and networks that keep the country 




Future research needs to be conducted on how climate change is impacting dams.  The 
United States is not the only country to have built dams in the last century and research on how 
countries across the world are handling dam aging and deterioration can provide clues for how 
the United States might proceed.  Innovative solutions to reduce the economic costs of repairing 
the national dam infrastructure network are required as in recent years Congress has avoided 
making any concrete moves to address infrastructure defects when it seems that Congress will be 
the main, if not only, funder for these improvements.   
The United States’ infrastructure construction slowed down as the 20th century came to 
an end.  As with construction, maintenance has also been lackadaisical over the last few decades 
and this oversight is beginning to make itself felt.  Every year more dams are reclassified as 
‘high-risk’ and every year dam failures happen somewhere in the United States.  In 2019, 
Spencer Dam, in Nebraska, was one of the ones that failed.  Other communities should look at 
Spencer Dam for lessons about the dangers of ice and underestimation of.  For planners and 
policy makers, changes need to be made addressing lack of resources, changing environments, 
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